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The Special Purpose District Reconsidered: The 
Fifth Circuit’s Recent Declaration that the Edwards 
Aquifer Authority is a Special Purpose District under 
the Voting Rights Act, and the Tortured History that 






This article seeks to use the Voting Rights Act dispute that followed 
the creation of the Edwards Aquifer Authority to examine the statute’s 
possible consequences for common pool resource governance. 
In its 2019 decision, League of United Latin American Citizens 
(“LULAC”) v. Edwards Aquifer Authority (“EAA”),1 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the configuration of 
the EAA governing board did not violate the one person, one vote principle 
of the Voting Rights Act.2  This central Texas authority—which regulates 
the quantity of groundwater pumped from one of the nation’s largest 
aquifers—consists of three water user regions: agricultural irrigators from 
Del Rio to San Antonio, Texas; urban consumers in San Antonio, Texas; 
and recreational users, as well as federally protected endangered species in 
the spring region from San Antonio to just south of Austin, Texas.3 
As this article suggests, under the Equal Protection Clause and the 
Voting Rights Act, the one person, one vote principle would appear to 
confer on the urban water users of San Antonio a vastly greater number of 
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Supp. 3d 735 (W.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d, League of United Latin American Citizens v. 
Edwards Aquifer Authority, 937 F.3d 457, 471–472 (5th Cir. 2019). 
2. League of United Latin American Citizens, 937 F.3d at 471–472. 







votes than the irrigation users or the spring users.  However, from the 
Justice Department’s preclearance of the EAA board under section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act in 1993 until the Fifth Circuit’s 2019 decision in 
LULAC, federal authorities have approved a board that apportions roughly 
equal representation to each of the three aquifer user groups (irrigators, 
urban users, and spring users) rather than basing representation on 
population.4 
The Fifth Circuit rejected an equal protection challenge to the 
Edwards board on the basis that the EAA is a “special purpose district,” a 
“unit of local government historically designed to provide an individualized 
response to the special problems of a particular locality.”5  One well-
accepted definition of special purpose districts describes them as 
“organized governmental units operating outside the realm of general 
county government established to perform a single function or 
multifunction as authorized by the enabling body creating them.”6 
Interestingly, in the 1990s, the Texas legislature and the United States 
Justice Department applied principles consistent with the special purpose 
district exception but never actually identified the EAA as such.7  This 
article analyzes the circuitous process by which the mutually suspicious 
users of the Edwards Aquifer struggled to create a board that would protect 
their interests while somehow passing the Voting Rights Act’s muster.  The 
logic they employed to do so was consistent with the special purpose 
district, even though the EAA was not identified this way until years later, 
in 2019.8 
A subsequent article will question whether the EAA actually conforms 
to the letter or spirit of the special purpose district exception to the one 
person, one vote principle in light of the developments in Edwards 
Aquifer’s use over almost thirty years.  This article will suggest the possible 
damage to constitutional voting rights if the federal courts continue to apply 
the special purpose district exception to the EAA if it no longer applies. 
 
4. EAA Timeline, EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY, https://perma.cc/KGA4-2ACV. 
5. Michael Goldsmith, Voting-Priority Qualifications for Voting in Special Purpose 
Districts Beyond the Scope of One Man-One Vote, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 687, 692 (1974), 
https://perma.cc/9W4T-FMBS. 
6. U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, PROFILE OF 
COUNTY GOVERNMENT 37 (1972). 
7. See EAA Timeline, supra note 4 (The floor debates of S.B. 1477—the enabling 
legislation for the Edwards Aquifer Authority—as well as the floor debates of H.B. 3189—
which created the 4-7-4 configuration of the Edwards Aquifer Authority Board—contain 
discussions of the need to deviate from One Person, One Vote to protect the less populous 
irrigation and spring user regions.  Correspondence between the Department of Justice and 
Texas water leadership also acknowledged the disparate user groups and population in the 
three regions that used the Edwards Aquifer). 






The Interplay Between Common Pool Resources and Local 
Government 
 
Attorney and geographer Rutherford Platt observed that “[t]he 
influence of law and politics is ubiquitous as a driver of human interaction 
with the natural world.”9  Platt described local governments as the “primary 
source of public oversight of land use in the United States”10 and the legal, 
political, and geographic characteristics of local governments as 
determinants of land use policy.11  In this context, Platt noted the 
proliferation of “special districts and regional authorities” to provide 
“diverse public services at various geographic scales.”12  Among the special 
districts that exercise “primary public oversight of land use,” none plays a 
more critical role than those charged with regulating common pool 
resources like groundwater.  As of 2017, 60 percent of Texas’s total water 
demand of 16.1 million acre-feet came from this source.13 
A common pool resource benefits individual users in a group, often in 
the absence of rules apportioning use to ensure the long-term preservation 
of the resource.  Without such rules, the default incentive for each 
individual user is to maximize his or her individual utility by using as much 
of the resource as possible.  This individually rational strategy produces a 
collectively irrational result: the benefit to everyone diminishes if each 
individual pursues his or her own self-interest.  The value of a common 
pool resource can be reduced through overuse because the supply of the 
resource is not unlimited, and using more than can be replenished can result 
in scarcity.14  Elinor Ostrom, the famous scholar of common pool resources, 
identified grazing meadows, irrigation water, fish populations, and 
groundwater as prominent examples of common pool resources.15 
This article analyzes the formulation of the governing body of the 
Edwards Aquifer Authority.  A major common pool resource, the Edwards 
Aquifer of south and central Texas is a crescent-shaped, 176-mile-long 
body of groundwater that reaches from Del Rio, through San Antonio, to 
south Austin, Texas, and serves almost two million people.16  Specifically, 
this article analyzes the legal and statutory process in the 1990s by which 
 
9. RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY: GEOGRAPHY, LAW, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 6 (3rd ed. 2014).  
10. Id. at 185–186.  
11. Id. 
12. PLATT, supra note 9, at 185–186.  
13. TEXAS WATER DEVELOPMENT BOARD, 2017 STATE WATER PLAN: WATER FOR 
TEXAS 63–68 (2017), https://perma.cc/357E-2MQB.  
14. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 1–8 (reprint ed. 2015). 
15. Id. at 58–178. 
16. Darcy Frownfelter, The Edwards Aquifer Authority, in ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS 






Texas ultimately formulated a governing board for the Edwards Aquifer 
Authority that represented the interests of three different aquifer user 
groups—irrigators, urban water consumers, and protectors of endangered 
springs—and received ultimate approval from the United States 
Department of Justice under the now-defunct Preclearance Requirement of 
Section Five of the Voting Rights Act. 
In order to analyze the legal and political processes that resulted in the 
governance of the Edwards, analysts of common pool resource governance 
in other contexts prove invaluable.  In particular, the work that Elinor 
Ostrom did on the governance of common pool resources in general and 
groundwater basins provides insights into the characteristics of governing 
arrangements that tend to endure for long periods of time.17  Ostrom and 
other common pool resource scholars study the circumstances under which 
common pool resource users succeed or fail in their efforts to disrupt 
default rules of use that exhaust a resource and to replace them with rules 
that sustain it.18  Ostrom is unique among these scholars because she 
questions the inevitable need for unilateral intervention by a larger 
governmental entity—a “Leviathan”—to coerce common pool resource 
users to adopt new rules.19  Based on her studies of different common pool 
resources, Ostrom did not reject the practical need to appeal to higher 
political or legal authorities in the struggle to implement new rules in some 
cases, or for higher governmental authorities to play a role in the ongoing 
regulation of the resource.  Ostrom calls this “polycentric” regulation 
(responsibility for governing the common resource may form nested tiers 
from the lowest governmental level up to the highest in an interconnected 
system).20  However, while she sees no guaranteed formula for success in 
common pool resource governance, Ostrom insists that the most successful 
governance originates with the users themselves: bottom-up self-
government.21 
Consistent with this observation, Ostrom also insisted that the 
characteristics of long-enduring common pool resource regulation she 
observed did not amount to a “formula for success” in other contexts.22  In 
the end, each resource was idiosyncratic.  Nevertheless, Ostrom clearly 
believed that some systems worked better than others, and that the most 
successful common pool resource regulation originated with decision-
making by the local users.23  Consider the eight characteristics of successful 
 
17. OSTROM, supra note 14, at 58–178. 
18. See, e.g., Jay Walljasper, Elinor Ostrom’s 8 Principles for Managing A 
Commons, ON THE COMMONS (Oct. 2, 2011), https://perma.cc/77BL-YYHG.  
19. OSTROM, supra note 14, at 8–12.  
20. Id. at 133–136. 
21. Walljasper, supra note 18.  
22. OSTROM, supra note 14, at 88–90.  






common pool resource governance she advanced in Governing the 
Commons, six of which depend directly on local users for success (marked 
by asterisks): 
 
Define clear group boundaries. * 
Match rules governing use of common goods to local needs and 
conditions. * 
Ensure that those affected by the rules can participate in 
modifying the rules. * 
Make sure the rule-making rights of community members are 
respected by outside authorities. 
Develop a system, carried out by community members, for 
monitoring members’ behavior. * 
Use graduated sanctions for rule violators. * 
Provide accessible, low-cost means for dispute resolution. * 
Build responsibility for governing the common resource in 
nested tiers from the lowest level up to the entire interconnected 
system (“polycentric governance”).24 
 
Indeed, the importance Ostrom placed on devising political 
boundaries that were coextensive with the natural resource itself 
underscores the importance of all concerned users having a place at the 
decision-making table.25  Ostrom observed common pool resource 
governance in which the users of the resource themselves made the 
decisions concerning the issues listed above.26 
Still, Ostrom’s rejection of the governmental or judicial Leviathan that 
unilaterally imposes usage rules on a common pool resource is more 
nuanced than one might expect.  In her case histories of California 
groundwater basins, for example, she describes those basins with a single 
dominant user group that can impose rules on other users as the most 
efficient.27  With regard to the eighth factor listed above—”nested 
authorities” up a legal and political hierarchy that govern a resource—
Ostrom suggests that a Leviathan may be necessary in the long term, but 
the governmental entity formed by the users should devise the rules of use 
that higher governmental authorities later enforce.28 
Texas groundwater law and regulation exhibit many of the difficulties 
Ostrom would predict when her eight characteristics of enduring common 
pool resource management are significantly absent.  Most obviously, 
 
24. OSTROM, supra note 14, at 88–101.  
25. Id. at 88–93.  
26. Walljasper, supra note 18.  
27. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 14, at 111–132 (Ostrom’s comparison of the 
negotiations that led to new rules of use for the Raymond Basin and the Central Basin). 






approximately fifty-four counties overlying aquifers in Texas have no 
groundwater conservation districts whatsoever, leaving other entities to 
generate needed data for the state water planning process and leaving 
groundwater almost entirely unregulated.29  These counties operate on what 
one might describe as a partially Hobbesian, partially “top-down” 
Leviathan approach that the Texas Water Development Board imposes.30 
Moreover, with some exceptions, the entire system of local 
groundwater districts conforms to county political boundaries.31  Ostrom’s 
observation that the boundaries of a successful groundwater district 
conform to the boundaries of the natural resource itself goes largely 
unheeded.  Just one example: a 2011 study by the Bureau of Economic 
Geology reported that twenty-one different groundwater districts on the 
local level regulated a single major regional aquifer, the Carrizo Wilcox.32  
The report suggests that the districts experience ongoing difficulties 
arriving at accurate groundwater availability data for their portions of the 
aquifer, and that a number of them struggle with over-pumping.33  The 
Texas Water Development Board gathers data from the twenty-one districts 
to calculate groundwater availability without certainty that the local 
numbers are accurate.34  
Another general observation exemplifies the way that local 
groundwater governance in Texas deviates from Ostrom’s 
recommendations.  State law provides that the state legislature can form a 
groundwater district, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality can 
work with the legislature to form a district, or local residents who use the 
aquifer can petition to form one.35  A minority of groundwater districts have 
come into existence through action by local residents.36 
The Edwards Aquifer Authority is unique in Texas’s local 
groundwater regulation.  The Authority’s boundaries largely follow the 
configuration of the aquifer itself, excluding a farther north segment 
separated geologically and by user groups.37  The Edwards experienced the 
 
29. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), Texas Groundwater 
Conservation Districts, https://perma.cc/8TG6-8524.  
30. See, e.g., TEXAS WATER DEVELOPMENT BOARD, supra note 13, at 65–68.  
31. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), supra note 29.  
32. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC GEOLOGY, CARRIZO-WILCOX AQUIFER STUDY, 93–135 
(2011), https://perma.cc/E98B-53TB.  
33. Id. at 221–225.  
34. Id. 
35. Michael Booth, Trey Nesloney & Deborah Trejo, Chapter 36: Groundwater 
Conservation Districts and Subsidence Districts, in ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER 
RESOURCES 16-2 – 16-6 (Mary Sahs, 5th ed. 2019).  
36. Id.  
37. Ian C. Jones, Texas Water Dev. Bd., Defining Groundwater Flow Characteristics 
in the Northern Segment of the Edwards Aquifer Based on Groundwater Chemistry, 2 






rough trajectory Ostrom described in the groundwater basins in southern 
California: Hobbesian rules of use that led to over-pumping, followed by 
litigation that led to a court order requiring decreased pumping, followed 
by negotiation and mutual agreements to reduce pumping that the court 
incorporated into an order and judgment.38  However, in the case of the 
Edwards, the lawsuit that served as the triggering event to produce new 
negotiated rules of use was different than in Ostrom’s examples: the Sierra 
Club filed a citizen suit under the Endangered Species Act to maintain 
adequate spring flows at Comal and San Marcos Springs to help ensure the 
survival of listed plant and animal species.39  The negotiating process to 
create new rules acknowledged the interests of three user groups: 
agricultural (Del Rio to Bexar County), urban (Bexar County), and spring 
users (Comal to southern Travis County).40 
The issue of how distinct aquifer user groups would be represented in 
a new governing body for a common pool resource formed a critical chapter 
in the history of the Edwards.  This raises an interesting issue with regard 
to Ostrom’s writings.  She recognized the necessity of “polycentric 
governance” for many of the common pool resources she studied but left 
ambiguous the role that a panoply of state and federal laws would have on 
the formulation of common pool resource governance.41  One such law is 
the federal Voting Rights Act. 
In her account of California groundwater interests throughout the state 
that worked with state legislators to formulate legislation, Ostrom uses the 
term “pumpers.”42  This could mean landowners with the right to pump 
groundwater from under their land, or it could mean private or public water 
supply companies that pump groundwater for consumers.  Elsewhere, 
Ostrom refers to groundwater “users.”43  This could mean “appropriators” 
who secure groundwater for uses physically removed from the overlying 
 
38. OSTROM, supra note 14, at 104–126. 
39. Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO-91-CA-069, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 151353 (W.D. 
Tex. Feb. 1, 1993), appeal dismissed sub nom. Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 995 F.2d 571 (5th 
Cir. 1993). 
40. Todd H. Votteler, Raiders of the Lost Aquifer? Or, the Beginning of the End to 
Fifty Years of Conflict over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 284 (2004), 
https://perma.cc/368A-2UEY; The EAA: A Success Story, EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY, 
https://perma.cc/UF64-NXSH. 
41. OSTROM, supra note 14, at 133–142; see also, Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets 
and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 
641, 641–672 (2010). 
42. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 14, at 124 (“In Raymond Basin, the number of 
pumpers was relatively small, and one participant—the City of Pasadena—was more 
dominant than was any participant in West Basin or Central Basin”); see also OSTROM, 
supra note 14, at 125. 
43. See OSTROM, supra note 14, at 106, 124–126 (for “use”, “users”, and descriptions 






land, or retail consumers who purchase water from an “appropriator” water 
company.  With regard to any of the groundwater districts Ostrom 
documented, the scope of the franchise and the weight of representation 
afforded to user groups remain open questions without detailed inquiry 
within the boundaries of her book.44 
No doubt Ostrom would have delineated the groundwater user 
categories she meant by each of these terms based on her research.  In 
Governing the Commons, however, she did not describe how groundwater 
district inhabitants would be afforded the right to vote.  What weight did 
each voter have?  Did the districts formulate their voting systems based on 
the type of issue being decided?  Ostrom recognized the courts and the 
hierarchy of political entities that could make critical decisions in 
governing groundwater.45  Aside from California groundwater law, 
governing codes of groundwater basins, and groundwater-related statutes 
at the state level, however, Ostrom did not appear to give as much thought 
to laws like the Voting Rights Act that could affect the creation of a 
groundwater district and the formulation of its governing board. 
Without question, the Voting Rights Act continues to play an 
important role in determining the governance of groundwater districts, even 
after the United States Supreme Court eviscerated the Preclearance Process 
under Section 5 of the statute: as recently as 2018–2019, the EAA 
governing board faced a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in League 
of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Edwards Aquifer Authority 
(EAA).46 
By analyzing the history of the Voting Rights Act dispute over the 
governance of the Edwards Aquifer Authority, this article seeks to analyze 
a dimension of common pool resource regulation that remains an open 
question in Ostrom’s Governing the Commons. 
 
The Edwards Aquifer, Its Diverse Users, and Efforts to Govern It 
Before the Edwards Aquifer Authority 
 
The Edwards Aquifer’s Nature, Importance, and Limitations 
 
In order to understand the controversy over the regulation of the 
Edwards Aquifer, some information about the aquifer and its users as of the 
early 1990s is necessary. 
 
44. See OSTROM, supra note 14, at 103–181.  
45. Id. at 123–142 (for the role of courts and local groundwater districts in arriving 
at sustainable rules of aquifer use). 






As already described, the Edwards Aquifer stretches 176 miles in a 
crescent shape, covering approximately 3,600 square miles in six counties, 
starting just east of the Del Rio city limits, stretching across San Antonio, 
through New Braunfels, and ending north of San Marcos around Kyle, 
Texas.47  The Edwards ranges in width from five to thirty miles and consists 
of a “[b]elt of porous, water-bearing, primarily carbonate rocks in the 
Balcones Fault Zone.”48  The Edwards sustains approximately forty aquatic 
species, nine cave-dwelling species, seven federally listed endangered 
species, and one federally listed threatened species.49  The limestone that 
comprises the Edwards Aquifer recharges quickly in response to 
precipitation but also loses water quickly in its absence.50  Recharge of the 
Edwards is highly variable, ranging from 46,000 to two million acre-feet 
per year.51  Water in the Edwards flows from west to east, then northeast, 
and it discharges naturally at springs, especially Comal Springs at New 
Braunfels and San Marcos Springs in San Marcos, Texas.52 
The underground formation generally falls in elevation from west to 
east.  The formation also generally dips toward the Gulf of Mexico.  The 
water level in the Edwards generally decreases from the west to the east.  
Most of the water in the Edwards comes from the flows of surface streams 
located in the upper portion of the Nueces River Basin, the upper portion 
of the San Antonio River basin, and part of the upper portion of the 
Guadalupe River Basin, collectively called the contributory watershed.53 
The above-described recharge area bounds the aquifer to the north; the 
so called “bad water line” bounds the aquifer to the south.  The bad water 
line consists of a region where the water moves at rates of flow considered 
insignificant compared to the remainder of the aquifer, and which separates 
water containing less than on thousand milligrams per liter of total 
dissolved solids (“TDS”) from water containing more than one thousand 
milligrams per liter of TDS.54  Water along and south of the bad water line 
contains much higher concentrations of minerals and hydrogen sulfide.55 
 
47. U.S. Geological Survey, Edwards Aquifer Study in Texas, (last visited Mar. 14, 
2020, 10:00 PM) https://perma.cc/5FMK-V76S.  
48. U.S. Geological Survey, supra note 47.  
49. Gregg Eckhardt, Endangered Species of the Edwards Aquifer, THE EDWARDS 
AQUIFER WEBSITE, (last visited Mar. 14, 2020, 10:00 PM) https://perma.cc/6ERS-JTGX.  
50. U.S. Geological Survey, New Insights into the Edwards Aquifer: Brackish Water, 
Simulation Drought, and the Role of Uncertainty Analysis, (Feb. 2016) 
https://perma.cc/WPX7-NYUT.   
51. Sierra Club, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 151353 at 6.  
52. Id. at 3.  
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 4. 







Although the aquifer itself lies below six Texas counties, a total of 
nine counties use Edwards water in some capacity: Atascosa, Bexar, 
Caldwell, Frio, Guadalupe, (a small segment of) Kinney, Medina, Uvalde, 
and Wilson Counties.56  Aquifer water flows from west to east and then 
north-northeast, placing Uvalde and Medina Counties “upstream” and 
Comal and Hays Counties “downstream.”  In the western counties, the 
Edwards Aquifer supplies irrigation for corn and cotton crops; cheap 
Edwards Aquifer water is critical to keeping the cost of production low and 
retaining already slim profit margins.57  In the northeastern counties, the 
Edwards supports the largest springs in Texas at New Braunfels and San 
Marcos.58  These springs, in turn, feed the Guadalupe River.  The 
Guadalupe relies on the aquifer for 30 percent of its flow during normal 
rainfall years and up to 70 percent of its flow during drought conditions.59  
Comal and Hays Counties rely on the springs for recreation, tourism, and 
academic study.60  The springs support populations of flora and fauna in 
danger of extinction.61  Support of these two spring systems requires 
approximately 350,000 acre-feet (af) per year, over one-half of the annual 
637,000 af/year total aquifer recharge.62  One acre-foot is the amount of 
water necessary to cover one acre of land with one foot of water; one acre-
foot equals 325,851 gallons.63 
As of the early 1990s, when the Edwards litigation occurred, the 
Edwards Aquifer was the sole source of water for approximately 1.5 million 
people, including the inhabitants of San Antonio, and was designated as the 
sole source aquifer for the region under the Safe Drinking Water Act.64  In 
the 1990s, the Edwards supported approximately 700,000 to 800,000 jobs 
and cumulative annual incomes of approximately $13 to $15 billion.65  Six 
downstream river basins rely on the flow of the aquifer for their existence, 
which in turn provide water for residents all the way to the Gulf of 
Mexico.66  The Guadalupe River basin alone, which relies on the Edwards 
Aquifer for approximately 21–32 percent of its annual flow, contained 
approximately 80,000 residents in the 1990s.67 
 
56. Sierra Club, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 151353 at 4. 
57. Id. at 3.  
58. Id. at 5.  
59. Id. at 5, 26. 
60. Id. at 28.  
61. Id. at 14, 19–21. 
62. Id. at 5, 30, 31. 
63. Id. 
64. 42 U.S.C. § 300(f) – (g) (2016). 
65. Sierra Club, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 151353 at 14. 
66. Id.  






In the 1950s, peak-to-trough fluctuations in the water level varied an 
average of three feet; that same variation now stands at thirty feet each 
year.68  Another indication of the excessive demands being placed on the 
Edwards can be measured by Comal and San Marcos springs’ flow as a 
percentage of total recharge.  From 1934 until the 1990s, spring flows fell 
from about 50 percent of total recharge to below 20 percent.69  Recharge of 
the aquifer from rainfall and from surface streams is highly variable, 
ranging from 46,000 to two million af/year.70  Because the aquifer both 
recharges and loses water quickly, the rate of recharge varies widely from 
year to year, while demand steadily increases.71  The total annual demand 
on the aquifer totaled approximately 30,000 af/year at the turn of the 
century; the annual demand in the 1980s reached an average of 500,000 
af/year.72  The annual demand in the mid-1990s reached approximately 
540,000 af.73  In the 1990s, demands on the Edwards Aquifer already 
exceeded the aquifer’s known firm capacity during dry years, which led to 
over-drafting, or “mining.”74  The consequences of mining included the 
possible destruction of already-endangered species and of the water supply 
itself.75 
The 500,000–540,000 af/year range of use threatened to dry up the 
springs in Comal and Hays Counties in 1984, 1989, and 1990.76  Given the 
condition of the worst drought of the century, aquifer water use would have 
to be reduced to approximately 200,000 af/year to preserve the springs at a 
level sufficient to ensure the survival of the endangered species that live 
there.77 
Over-drafting also allows the intrusion of highly mineralized water 
from underground water adjacent to the aquifer, otherwise held in check by 
the hydrostatic pressure exerted by the aquifer.  Such “bad water” has been 
discovered underlying the San Marcos Springs itself.78  A decrease in the 
volume of water also decreases the aquifer’s capacity to assimilate effluent 
and other forms of pollution.79  If spring flows fall below certain levels, the 
springs are dominated by return flows from municipal and industrial 
 
68. Sierra Club, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 151353 at 5. 
69. Id. at 6.  
70. Id. 
71. Id.  
72. Id. . 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 6-7. 
75.  Id. at 6.  
76. Id.  
77. Id. at 30–31. 
78. Id. at 8. 






discharges, along with contaminated runoff from adjacent agricultural and 
urban areas.80 
Although the Edwards water supply did not reach critical levels of 
shortage until the 1980s and 1990s, users of the Edwards Aquifer have seen 
harbingers of a possible water shortage for decades.  In the 1950s, Central 
and South Texas experienced the most severe drought of the century to 
date.81  Even at the levels of aquifer usage reached in the 1950s, levels in 
the Edwards reached such a low that San Antonio sought alternative water 
supplies, such as Canyon Lake, which was being constructed at that time.82  
San Antonio had undertaken intermittent efforts to regulate the aquifer and 
create alternative water supplies since the city failed to obtain water rights 
to Canyon Lake during the 1950s.83  However, San Antonio did not resume 
full-scale efforts to locate other sources of water until the 1980s.84 
Attempts to regulate aquifer usage during the 1950s drought failed as 
well because there was no state agency empowered to regulate pumpage, 
and because Texas adhered to the common law rule of capture, discussed 
in a subsequent section.  Between 1988 and 1990, use of water from the 
Edwards Aquifer exceeded recharge 47 percent of the time.85  In July 1990, 
the Texas Water Development Board predicted that on the basis of then-
current trends, water use would reach more than 700,000 af/year by 2030, 
and yields in excess of levels that would ensure the flow of the Comal and 
San Marcos springs had already been reached.86 
 
The Edwards Aquifer’s Diverse Users as of the 1990s 
 
Information from the 1990s concerning the populations of the nine 
counties that use the aquifer, along with the quantity and quality of their 
water use, is critical to understanding the dispute over the regulation of the 
Edwards.  The following information was derived from 1990 census87 data, 
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as well as water usage data compiled by the erstwhile Edwards 
Underground Water District and the Guadalupe Blanco River Authority:88 
 
(1) Atascosa County 
(a) 30,533 total inhabitants. App. 69% of this population was 
of voting age, or approximately 21,068 persons. 
(b) 46.5% of the population was white and non-Hispanic.  
(c) 52.6% was of any Hispanic origin; 48% was Mexican-
American. 
(d) 0.5% was African-American. 
(2) Bexar County 
(a) 1,185,394 total inhabitants. 70.8% of this population was 
of voting age, or approximately 839,259 persons. 
(b)  41.9% of the total population was non-Hispanic and 
white. 
(c)  49.9% was Hispanic of any origin; 45.5% was Mexican-
American. 
(d)  7.1% was African-American. 
(3) Caldwell County 
(a)  26,392 total inhabitants. App. 70% of this population was 
of voting age, or approximately 18,475 persons. 
(b)  51.3% of the population was white and non-Hispanic. 
(c)  37.8% was of any Hispanic origin; 35.4% was Mexican-
American. 
(d)  10.7% was African-American. 
(4)  Comal County 
(a) 51,832 total inhabitants. App. 74.2% of this population 
was of voting age, or approximately 38,460 persons. 
(b) 75.7% of the population was white and non-Hispanic.  
(c) 22.9% was of any Hispanic origin; 21.3% was Mexican-
American. 
(d) 0.9% was African-American. 
(5) Guadalupe County 
(a) 64,873 total inhabitants. App. 70% of this population was 
of voting age, or approximately 45,411 persons. 
(b) 63.9% of the population was white and non-Hispanic. 
(c) 29.7% was of any Hispanic origin; 27.2% was Mexican-
American. 
(d)  5.6% was African-American. 
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(6)  Hays County 
(a) 65,832 total inhabitants. App. 75.6% of this population 
was of voting age, or approximately 49,769 persons. 
(b) 68.1% of the population was white and non-Hispanic. 
(c) 27.8% was of any Hispanic origin; 25.7% was Mexican-
American. 
(d)  3.4% was African-American. 
(7) Kinney County 
(a) 3,119 total inhabitants. App. 74.9% of this population 
was of voting age, or approximately 2336 persons. 
(b) 46.9% of the population was white and non-Hispanic. 
(c)  50.3% was of Hispanic origin; 49.9% was Mexican-
American. 
(d) 1.8% was African-American. 
(8) Medina County 
(a) 27,312 total inhabitants. App. 70.3% of this population 
was of voting age, or approximately 19,200 persons. 
(b) 54.7% of the population was white and non-Hispanic. 
(c)  44.4% was of any Hispanic origin; 41.1% was Mexican-
American. 
(d) 0.5% was African-American. 
(9) Uvalde County 
(a) 23,340 total inhabitants. App. 71% of this population was 
of voting age, or approximately 16,571 persons. 
(b) 38.7% of the population was white and non-Hispanic. 
(c) 60.4% was of any Hispanic origin; 56.9% was Mexican-
American. 
(d) 0.2% was African-American. 
 
In addition to the above information about the nature of the inhabitants 
who would comprise the Edwards Aquifer Authority’s electorate in its early 
years, these counties’ water use patterns during the period are also basic to 
understanding the issues involved in regulating the Edwards Aquifer.  The 
United States Geological Survey provides the water districts in the Edwards 
region with estimated rates of pumpage on a county-by-county basis and 
according to the uses of the water in each county.89  These data provide 
concrete indications of the disparate interests at play in the controversies 
surrounding the Edwards. 
The USGS in San Antonio, Texas, explained that only five of the nine 
counties listed above pump water from the Edwards in a measurable 
 
89. D.S. Brown & J.T. Patton, Recharge to and Discharge from the Edwards Aquifer 







quantity: Uvalde, Bexar, Comal, Hays, and Medina.90  The other four 
counties are found over regions of the aquifer that contain largely brackish 
water and therefore rely on aquifer water pumped from the above five 
counties.91  These four dependent or vicarious counties are Atascosa (reliant 
on aquifer water from Medina County), Kinney (reliant on aquifer water 
from Uvalde County), Guadalupe, and Caldwell Counties.92  Guadalupe 
and Caldwell obtain aquifer water piped from various sources, largely Hays 
and Comal Counties, and also have an interest in the aquifer because 
surface waters on which these counties rely are fed by the Edwards.93 
The 1995 USGS statistics for the five counties that pump from the 
Edwards are as follows.  Note that total discharge includes both pumped 
water and water that emerges from springs; limits on aquifer pumpage 
discussed in subsequent chapters do not include the percentage of water 
that emerges from springs such as Comal and San Marcos, for example.94 
 
(A) Bexar County 
(1) Total 1995 discharge: 272,100 acre-feet (af) 
(2) Average daily usages in millions of gallons: 
(a)  4.6 million gallons/day in spring flow. 
(b) 204.2 million gallons/day in municipal uses. 
(c) 19.9 million gallons/day in industrial uses. 
(d) 7.4 million gallons/day in irrigation. 
(e) 6.8 million gallons/day to water livestock. 
(B) Comal County 
(1)  Total 1995 discharge: 325,000 af. 
(2) Average daily usages in millions of gallons: 
(a)  194.7 million gallons/day in spring flow. 
(b) 3 million gallons/day in municipal uses. 
(c) 11.8 million gallons/day in industrial uses. 
(d) 0.2 million, or 200,000, gallons/day in irrigation. 
(e) 0.2 million, or 200,000, gallons/day to water livestock. 
(C) Hays County 
(l) Total 1995 discharge: 127,800 acre-feet. 
(2) Average daily usages in millions of gallons: 
(a)  102 million gallons/day in spring flow. 
(b) 10.2 million gallons/day in municipal uses. 
(c) 1.3 million gallons/day in industrial uses. 
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(d) 0.1 million, or 100,000, gallons/day in irrigation. 
(e) 0.5 million, or 500,000, gallons/day to water livestock. 
(D)  Medina (plus Atascosa) Counties 
(l) Total 1995 discharge: 44,000 acre-feet. 
(2) Average daily usages in millions of gallons: 
(a)  no spring flow. 
(b) 5.2 million gallons/day in municipal uses. 
(c) no industrial uses. 
(d) 25.5 million gallons/day in irrigation. 
(e) 0.7 million, or 700,000, gallons/day to water livestock. 
(E) Uvalde (plus Kinney) Counties 
(1)  Total 1995 discharge: 908,000 af. 
(2) Average daily usages in millions of gallons: 
(a)  21.3 million gallons in spring flow. 
(b) 4.2 million gallons/day in municipal uses. 
(c) 0.4 million, or 400,000, gallons/day in industrial uses. 
(d) 51.7 million gallons/day in irrigation. 
(e) 1.3 million gallons/day to water domestic livestock. 
 
From these numbers, it is possible to construct three broad water use 
regions.  The northeastern region, consisting of Hays, Comal, and portions 
of Caldwell and Guadalupe Counties, can be described as the “spring user” 
region (Comal and Hayes Counties had a combined spring flow level of 
296.7 million gallons per day in 1995).  The central region, consisting of 
Bexar County, can be described as the “municipal user” region (Bexar 
County pumped 204.2 million gallons per day for municipal use in 1995).  
The southwestern region, consisting of Medina, Uvalde, and portions of 
Atascosa and Kinney Counties, together comprise the “irrigation user” 
region (Medina and Uvalde Counties together pumped 77.2 million gallons 
per day for irrigation in 1995).  Only Bexar County was large enough in the 
1990s to count municipal use as its primary use.95 
When one compares the populations of these three regions in the 
1990s with their respective water use levels, the smaller counties’ desire 
for representation to be apportioned according to different water uses, 
rather than according to population, becomes clear.  Bexar County’s 
population exceeded the combined populations of the spring user and 
irrigation use counties: 1,185,394 in Bexar County compared with 293,233 
in all eight other counties.96 
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The contrast in the ratio of inhabitants to acre-feet of water used each 
year is equally striking.  The ratio of water usage (spring flow and pumpage 
combined) to inhabitants in Comal County was 6.27 af/year per person.  In 
Bexar County, the same ratio was 0.229 af/year per person.  The amount of 
water in Comal County per capita was approximately twenty-four times 
more than in Bexar.  In Medina and Atascosa Counties combined, the same 
ratio was 1.32 af/year per person: approximately five times the amount of 
water per person in Bexar County.  These statistics not only demonstrate 
that the irrigator and spring counties would prefer a system of 
representation based on the different water uses rather than on population.  
Additionally, the water use to inhabitant ratios demonstrate that 
representatives from the irrigation- and spring-user counties, once elected 
to an aquifer authority, would be motivated to reject water allocation plans 
tied to population. 
The spring user region faced a unique problem: the ratio of aquifer 
water pumped per unit of population was quite small, but the economy of 
the spring user region was nevertheless dependent on maintaining the 
uninterrupted flow of water that naturally discharged from Comal and San 
Marcos Springs.97  The economic activities of both the irrigation-and 
spring-user counties relied on water in ways that the size of their 
populations did not reflect. 
From the population and water-use patterns above, one can also 
correlate the three regions with the attitudes and legal strategies their 
inhabitants have used to maximize their respective control over aquifer 
water.  In terms of the respective regions’ attitudes toward aquifer 
regulation, the above-listed population and pumpage statistics make clear 
why both the spring user and irrigation user regions would view Bexar 
County as the greatest threat to the aquifer, and why in a prisoners’ 
dilemma–type situation both of these regions would refuse to act without 
concrete indications that Bexar County had acted first.  Further, the 
pumpage levels per person in the irrigation user region help to indicate why 
the spring user region would also seek regulation over the irrigators.  
Consistent with the behavior predicted by the prisoners’ dilemma, the 
irrigation user region traditionally refused any pumpage limitations 
whatsoever from outside their own underground water districts, arguing 
that San Antonio was the biggest user and should therefore bear the entire 
brunt of cutbacks.98 
From the perspective of the spring user region, which had developed 
extensive surface sources of water such as Canyon Lake, both the irrigation 
region counties and Bexar County were responsible for the threatened 
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destruction of the Comal and San Marcos springs, as well as the Guadalupe 
River. 
The three regions’ respective legal strategies in the 1980s and 1990s 
were consistent with these attitudes.  The spring region, led by the 
Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority, was instrumental in each phase of the 
Sierra Club litigation.  The Endangered Species Act (ESA) offered the 
spring region a means of gaining control over the aquifer dispute.  Since 
the springs upon which this region’s economy so heavily relied were also 
home to the endangered species in question, the ESA created an 
independent, federal policy justification for regulating aquifer use in a way 
that benefited this region with a comparatively small population and a huge 
water use–to-inhabitant ratio (in terms of total discharge, not total 
pumpage). 
Inhabitants of the urban region—Bexar County—pursued varied legal 
strategies.  Before the endangered species dispute over the Edwards, the 
City of San Antonio’s water leadership sought to provide the other two user 
regions with assurances that the city would voluntarily reduce its 
dependence on the aquifer.99  These assurances proved difficult to make 
given the ignorance of, and hostility toward, aquifer regulation among 
many San Antonio residents, coupled with the continued absence of a 
surface water supply for the city. 
After the Endangered Species Act litigation necessitated new aquifer 
regulation, City of San Antonio water officials tried to expedite whatever 
plan they thought would gain the approval of Lucius Bunton, the federal 
judge who presided over the ESA litigation, and his water monitor, Joe 
Moore.100 
San Antonio leaders hoped for a settlement based on water usage 
cutbacks without respect to the configuration of the board being considered 
or whether the board was elected or appointed.101  City water officials were 
willing to forego advantages conferred by the Voting Rights Act in order 
to avoid the economic consequences of federal control of the aquifer.102  
Other representatives from San Antonio, along with the Mexican American 
Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) and the League of United 
Latin American Citizens (LULAC), fought hard for the application of the 
one person, one vote principle and the creation of single-member districts 
for the new authority.103  The Edwards Underground Water District 
(EUWD) board had just been reconfigured to better represent Bexar 
County’s population and ethnic composition when consideration of the 
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Edwards Aquifer Authority began, and the San Antonians involved in the 
EUWD litigation did not intend to lose ground: The Department of Justice 
and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ultimately 
accepted LULAC’s argument that replacing the elected EUWD board with 
an appointed EAA board violated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.104 
Finally, other San Antonians engaged in obstructionist and delaying 
tactics, arguing alternately that a new authority would violate their property 
rights, that the EUWD along with other local districts ought to retain 
control over the aquifer through an “interlocal board,” and that changes in 
Supreme Court precedent and in the text of the ESA itself might make the 
judge’s order in Sierra Club unenforceable.105 
Inhabitants of the irrigation region, with a small population and high 
ratio of population to water use, feared the prospect of decisions made by a 
regional aquifer board dominated by Bexar County.106  The irrigation 
region argued for equal representation for each of the three regions 
according to type of use.107  Although the irrigation region was split among 
livestock raisers, dry land farmers, and irrigators, irrigators had a 
disproportionately strong voice. As will be discussed infra, H.R. 3189 gave 
Bexar County greater representation than either of the other two regions.  
After this legislation passed, the underground water districts in Medina and 
Uvalde Counties sued along with irrigators in state court to invalidate the 
aquifer authority on the basis that the board’s powers would violate 
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Historic Efforts in Texas to Regulate Groundwater and the 
Edwards Aquifer 
 
The Rule of Capture 
 
The common law rule of capture, or “English rule,” forms the legal 
context in which the controversy over the regulation of water drawn from 
the Edwards Aquifer takes place.  Texas stands alone among southwestern 
and western states in retaining this common law rule, which originated in 
regions (including parts of east Texas) with abundant rainfall, before 
scientific knowledge concerning aquifers developed, and in the absence of 
modern population pressures.109 
In brief, the rule of capture draws a qualitative distinction between 
groundwater and surface water, relying on the fiction that surface and 
groundwater are independent of one another.110  Whereas water in a surface 
stream of sufficient dimension belongs to the people of Texas, and the 
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC, now the 
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, or TCEQ) regulates its use 
through a prior appropriation-based permitting system, a landowner is 
deemed to own any “percolating” water under his or her property and is 
free to withdraw it at will, without regard to depletion of groundwater 
underneath adjoining land, as long as he or she uses the water beneficially, 
does not cause land to subside, and does not intentionally waste the 
water.111 
The basis for absolute groundwater ownership traces to the 1843 
decision Acton v. Blundell, which “is founded on the idea that a landowner 
should have dominion over the percolating ground water in the same way 
he has dominion over other constituents in the subsoil.”112 
The Texas Supreme Court adopted the English common-law rule in 
1904 in Houston & Texas Central Railway Co. v. East, in which the 
Houston & Texas Central Railway Company withdrew water from its land 
and used it off premises to maintain its trains, which dried its neighbor’s 
wells, including that of East, who argued that a landowner’s right was 
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“correlative” or limited by a “doctrine of reasonable use.”113  Second, East 
argued that the groundwater had to be used on the overlying lands.114 
The Texas Supreme Court rejected East’s arguments and held that a 
landowner has the exclusive right to water beneath his soil.  The Court 
adopted a tort-based rule with regard to groundwater: damnum abs que 
injuria, which means over-pumping is a loss which does not give rise to an 
action for damages.115 
The Texas rule of capture is a perfect codification of the Hobbesian 
rule of use.  Compared to the “correlative rights” and “beneficial use” legal 
doctrines that applied to the groundwater Ostrom studied in California,116 
the default groundwater law in Texas presents a far more daunting obstacle 
to implementing new rules of use to prevent an aquifer’s exhaustion.  One 
simple indication of this unfortunate reality: Ostrom’s basin users were able 
to sue one another for over-pumping.117  In Texas, no such legal catalyst 
existed to change the rules of use.  The coincidence that federally protected 
endangered species inhabited Edwards-fed springs provided a legal deus ex 
machina that disrupted Hobbesian use of the Edwards Aquifer.  To this day, 
a limited range of restrictions on groundwater exists in Texas: subsidence 
prevention, Edwards rules that protect federally listed species, and 
groundwater district rules that restrict pumping through mechanisms like 
well monitoring and spacing in order to achieve desired future conditions 
comprise the only restrictions on groundwater pumping in Texas.118 
 
Pre-EAA Legal History of Edwards Regulation 
 
In 1959, the Texas Legislature placed the Edwards under the 
jurisdiction of the Edwards Underground Water District (EUWD).119  The 
EUWD’s enabling legislation made it responsible for Edwards recharge, 
pollution prevention, and water supply and drought planning.120 
The EUWD remained subject to the rule of capture: Users were free 
to pump as much groundwater as they could without liability to third 
parties.121  Downstream surface water rights holders, groundwater pumpers, 
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and spring users in the Guadalupe River Basin were all concerned that the 
EUWD lacked any legal authority to limit the rule of capture: Spring flows 
at Comal Springs and San Marcos Springs continued to diminish, for 
example.122  By 1966, a Texas court of appeals concluded that over-
pumping from the Edwards in San Antonio eliminated reliable flows in the 
Guadalupe River downstream.123  
In 1989, surface water rightsholders downstream of San Antonio 
worked with the Guadalupe Blanco River Authority (GBRA) to bring a suit 
arguing that the Edwards was actually an underground river and therefore 
the property of the people of Texas and subject to prior appropriation 
permitting.124  In 1992, the TNRCC (now the TCEQ) produced a study and 
emergency administrative rulemaking to declare the Edwards an 
underground river.125  Both the GBRA-led litigation and the state-led 
rulemaking to recharacterize the Edwards from “percolating groundwater” 
to an “underground river” failed in the courts.126  
After the underground river efforts failed, environmental 
organizations recognized that they held interests in common with the 
residents in the spring user region who sought to prevent the exhaustion of 
the Comal and San Marcos Springs through excess groundwater pumping 
that the EUWD could not prevent.127  With strong support from the GBRA 
and leadership in San Marcos and New Braunfels, the Sierra Club filed 
federal suit so that Edwards withdrawals would be regulated for the benefit 
of threatened and endangered species dependent on discharges from Comal 
and San Marcos Springs.128 
 
Sierra Club v. Lujan: A Perfunctory Account 
 
As suggested at the outset, this article chiefly seeks to use the Voting 
Rights Act dispute that followed the creation of the Edwards Aquifer 
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Authority to examine the statute’s possible consequences for common pool 
resource governance.  The Endangered Species Act (ESA) controversy that 
catalyzed the Texas Legislature’s creation of the Authority after Sierra 
Club v. Lujan was decided in federal district court and involved an intricate 
set of issues that focused on preserving habitat under Section 4 and 
preventing takes of endangered species under Section 9 of the ESA.129  
Simply put, the court ordered Texas to create legal mechanisms that would 
ensure sufficient decreases in groundwater pumping to protect the spring 
flows at San Marcos and Comal Springs.130  The court also ordered the 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) to determine how many 
cubic feet per second needed to flow into each spring system to ensure the 
species’ survival.131  The court issued interim spring flow levels based on 
expert testimony at trial pending the USFWS’s findings.132 
The failure of Texas or the USFWS to comply with the court’s order 
could have meant that Judge Bunton could find either in contempt, and 
uncertainty existed as to whether the USFWS could assume control over 
regulating the Edwards should Texas fail to devise an effective regulatory 
entity. 
 
Senate Bill 1477: Codified Secondary Rules of Aquifer Use 
 
The Edwards Aquifer Authority Act, or S.B. 1477, created the most 
comprehensive groundwater regulation in Texas history.  The Authority 
summarized its own powers as follows:133 
 
To issue permits on all wells that do not meet exempt well 
requirements; 
To limit the total amount of annual water withdrawals to 
572,000 acre-feet; 
To have meters on all wells that do not meet exempt well 
requirements; 
To require drought restrictions that include specific triggers 
and reduction amounts; 
To include a built-in interest group to consider the effect of 
the EAA’s actions on downstream users. 
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Conspicuously, S.B. 1477 established a nine-member appointed 
board.134  Section 1.09135 of the act would have achieved a rough appointed 
balance between urban users (Bexar County) (3), irrigation users (2) 
(Medina, Uvalde, and Atascosa Counties), spring users (Comal and Hays 
Counties) (2), a rotating member chosen from irrigation user counties (1), 
and an at-large advisory committee member (1): 
 
(a) The authority is governed by a board of nine directors. 
(b) The board consists of: 
(1) a member appointed by the South Central Texas Water 
Advisory Committee created by this Act; 
(2) three residents of Bexar County, with two residents 
appointed by the governing body of the city of San Antonio and 
one resident appointed by the Commissioners Court of Bexar 
County to represent cities and communities in the county other 
than the city of San Antonio; 
(3) one resident of Comal County or the city of New 
Braunfels appointed by the Commissioners Court of Comal 
County; 
(4) one resident of Hays County appointed by the governing 
body of the city of San Marcos; 
(5) one resident of Medina County appointed by the 
governing body of the Medina Underground Water Conservation 
District; 
(6) one resident of Uvalde County appointed by the 
governing body of the Uvalde Underground Water Conservation 
District, and; 
(7) one person appointed in rotation who is from Atascosa, 
Medina, or Uvalde counties, with that person appointed by the 
governing body of the Evergreen Underground Water District, by 
the Medina Underground Water Conservation District, or by the 
Uvalde County Underground Water Conservation District with 
the person appointed by the Evergreen Underground Water 
District serving the first term, followed by a person appointed by 
the Medina Underground Water Conservation District to serve the 
second term, followed by a person appointed by the Uvalde 
County Underground Water Conservation District to serve the 
third term, and rotating in that order of appointment for 
subsequent terms. 
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On Preclearance Review under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the 
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (Justice) refused to 
approve the appointed board.136  The subsequent section of this article 
explores in greater depth the Voting Rights implications of S.B. 1477’s 
appointed board and its ultimate rejection by the Department of Justice. 
 
S.B. 1477’s Appointed Board Under Voting Rights Act Scrutiny: 
State of Texas v. United States 
 
As just discussed, Section 1.09 of S.B. 1477 provided for a nine-
member board, with three representatives from each of the user group 
regions. The immediate issue under evaluation under Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act concerned the creation of an appointive board in the 
same piece of legislation that dissolved the Edwards Underground Water 
District, whose board members were elected.137  However, Texas officials 
knew that Department of Justice scrutiny under the Voting Rights Act 
represented a serious obstacle to the ultimate survival and success of the 
new Authority, since changes in the structure of the Authority’s board 
pursuant to the Voting Rights Act could cause the Authority’s potential 
constituents in the two less-populated regions to reject it altogether.138 
The Voting Rights Act obstacles that S.B. 1477 created paralleled the 
type of malapportioned representation that prompted the first reform of 
legislative districts in Texas.  In 1936, the state legislature amended the 
redistricting provisions in the state constitution to place a ceiling on the 
number of representatives possible from any one county.139  This ceiling 
served to protect the traditionally influential rural districts and to dilute the 
increasingly populous urban areas.140  The ceiling also assumed ethnic and 
racial dimensions, since the urban areas contained larger concentrations of 
Hispanic and African-American voters.141  By the mid-1960s, courts found 
disparities in the number of representatives per unit of population to be as 
great as 4.4 to 1.142 
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Had S.B.1477 proposed a board for the Edwards Aquifer Authority 
that called for elected rather than appointed members, the 3-3-3 structure 
of the board according to aquifer user groups would have reproduced the 
same type of population and ethnic/racial disparities found in the pre-
Voting Rights Act Texas legislative districts, but in exaggerated form.  
Statistics produced by the Texas Legislative Council reflect that the total 
voting-age populations of the three regions were as follows: 
 
Spring User Region.  
Comal County, Hays County, part of Guadalupe County, and 
part of Caldwell County: 130,954 (3 representatives). 
Urban User Region.  
Bexar County: 1,185,394 (3 representatives). 
Irrigation User Region.  
Medina County, Uvalde County, part of Atascosa County, 
part of Kinney County: 52, 901 (3 representatives)143 
 
The first state legislative districts challenged in Texas had given rural 
counties up to 4.4 times the representation of urban regions.144  If the 
original 3-3-3 Edwards Aquifer Authority Board had been elected, 
multiplication based on the above 1990 census numbers from the three user 
regions yields a surprising result: the vote of a person who lived in the 
spring user region resident would have 9.05 times the representation of a 
person in the urban user region.  The vote of an irrigation user region 
resident would have 22.4 times the representation of a person in the urban 
user region.  As Senator Armbrister—who authored S.B. 1477, which 
created the EAA—had put it, San Antonio water policy leadership “took it 
on the chin” by agreeing to an arrangement that in no way conformed to a 
one person, one vote standard.145 
Moreover, as with the first state legislative districts challenged in 
Texas, the Edwards Aquifer Authority’s urban–rural skew took on ethnic 
and racial dimensions.  The above-cited 1990 census numbers indicate that, 
taken together, approximately 657,305 African-American and Hispanic 
voters lived in the counties that contained the Edwards Aquifer Authority. 
Of these voters, 589,180 lived in Bexar County.  If the proposed 3-3-3 
board had been elective, approximately 89.6 percent of minority voters 
would have lived in the user region that suffered the most drastic voter 
dilution.146  This comparison with pre–Voting Rights Act Texas legislative 
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districts raises the issue that would become critical for the State of Texas if 
the Department of Justice were to require the Authority’s board to be 
elected rather than appointed: whether, or to what extent, the Edwards 
Aquifer Authority board should be compared to a general purpose unit of 
government like a city council or state legislature, and to what extent the 
Authority should be construed as a special purpose water district, to which 
the Supreme Court has largely declined to apply voting rights principles.147 
If the Justice Department and the courts had characterized the 
Edwards Aquifer Authority as a general purpose unit of government, the 
more representation from Bexar County would be required to satisfy the 
one person, one vote requirement.  As Bexar County’s weight on the 
Authority’s board increased, the likelihood of cooperation with the new 
Authority from the spring user and irrigation user regions decreased 
precipitously.  The 3-3-3 configuration was perceived as important in the 
effort to assure the irrigation and spring user regions that Bexar County’s 
overwhelming population advantage would not be used to drown out the 
interests of the two less-populated regions.148  As discussed subsequently, 
these considerations were at issue in the summer and fall of 1993, when the 
Texas Secretary of State submitted articles defending the Edwards Aquifer 
Authority’s appointed board of directors to the Department of Justice for 
evaluation under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.149 
The procedure by which S.B. 1477’s appointed board was evaluated 
requires a brief explanation.  In Beer v. United States, the United States 
Supreme Court held that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was 
designed to ensure that proposed changes in voting procedures did not lead 
to a retrogression in racial minorities’ capacity to participate effectively in 
the electoral process.150  Because it was among those states with a history 
of “substantial voting discrimination,” Texas was required to fulfill the 
requirements of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.151  
The provisions of Section 5 became effective whenever Texas 
“enact[ed] or [sought] to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite 
to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting . . . .”152  
In NAACP v. Hampton County Election Commission, the United States 
Supreme Court held that a voting-related enactment should be submitted 
for preclearance not only where the changes had the purpose or effect of 
impairing minority voting rights, but where “the challenged alteration has 
 
147. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 
(1973). 
148. GULLEY, supra note 81, at 51–58. 
149. See infra at 64–68 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (current version at 52 U.S.C. 
§ 10304 (2020))). 
150. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1976). 
151. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 329 (1966). 






the potential for discrimination.”153  Whatever the purpose or effect on 
voting rights, Texas had to submit the changes that S.B. 1477 wrought to 
the Department of Justice. 
In seeking preclearance from the Department of Justice, or in a 
subsequent declaratory judgment action in federal court, Texas bore the 
burden of demonstrating that the proposed change had neither 
discriminatory purpose nor effect.154  If the Department of Justice raised an 
objection, Texas could seek a declaratory judgment in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia.155  In order for the proposed 
measure to become law, the court was required to enter a judgment that the 
proposed “qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does 
not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging 
the right to vote on account of race or color . . . .”156  Until the court issued 
such an order, no person was to be denied the right to vote for failure to 
comply with the proposed procedure.157 
S.B. 1477’s appointed board came under scrutiny as a “qualification, 
prerequisite, standard, practice or procedure” related to voting because of 
the proposed abolition of the Edwards Underground Water District under 
Section 1.41, which an elected board administered and whose configuration 
had recently changed to better conform to the Voting Rights Act.158 
In Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, the Supreme Court considered 
whether state officials in Mississippi were required to submit for Section 5 
preclearance a plan that would take away from the school districts of eleven 
counties the prerogative to choose between appointing or electing their 
superintendents.159  Under the proposed plan, the state legislature granted 
the boards of education power to appoint the school superintendents in 
those eleven counties.  Allen held that such a change required Section 5 
preclearance: 
 
[a]n important county officer in certain counties was made 
appointive instead of elective.  The power of a citizen’s vote is 
affected by this amendment; after the change, he is prohibited 
from electing an officer formerly subject to the approval of the 
voters.  Such a change could be made either with or without 
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discriminatory purpose or effect; however, the purpose of Section 
5 was to submit such changes to scrutiny.160 
 
The Allen Court was careful to emphasize that a change from an 
elected to an appointed system did not in itself indicate the presence of a 
discriminatory purpose or effect but did require Section 5 evaluation.161  
Pursuant to Allen, the administrative standards by which the Department of 
Justice evaluated Section 5 submission listed a change from elected to 
appointed offices as a “change in voting” under the Act.162 
Justice Harlan’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Allen captures 
the fundamental problem in attempting to evaluate a change from elective 
to appointive offices under the Voting Rights Act: 
The statute involved in Bunton v. Patterson [r]aises a somewhat more 
difficult question of statutory interpretation.  If one looks to its impact on 
the voters, the State’s law making the office of school superintendent enacts 
a “voting qualification” of the most drastic kind.  While under the old 
regime all voters could cast a ballot, now none are qualified.  On the other 
hand, one can argue that the concept of “voting qualification” presupposes 
that there will be a vote.163 
In the dispute concerning the Edwards Aquifer Authority, the 
Department of Justice took the view of the newly created, appointed board 
as imposing the most drastic kind of voter qualification because it 
eliminated the opportunity to vote that had existed with the EUWD 
board.164  From this perspective, the change proposed by Texas could 
represent the “absolute prohibition on casting a ballot” described in 
Reynolds v. Sims.165  
The state of Texas, however, saw that an “effect on voting 
qualifications presupposed the existence of a vote.”166  No entity had ever 
exercised the type or extent of powers vested in the new Edwards Aquifer 
Authority (EAA), which made it difficult to compare the new authority with 
the Edwards Underground Water District (EUWD).  Had the citizens who 
exercised their voting rights to determine EUWD representatives lost 
power over functions the appointed EAA would now perform?  Or were the 
functions of the new EAA sui generis, so that it would be illogical to speak 
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in terms of the new board replacing the old one and subsuming the 
EUWD’s  authorities?   
At the time that Texas submitted the Edwards Aquifer Authority board 
plan for preclearance in 1993, the Edwards Underground Water District 
was in the midst of litigation to reformulate its board member districts 
under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in Williams v. Edwards 
Underground Water District.167  The Edwards Underground Water District 
had included five counties from its inception in 1959 until 1989: Hays, 
Comal, Bexar, Medina, and Uvalde.168  In 1989, in direct response to the 
aquifer plans proposed by the Regional Aquifer Coalition to the state 
legislature, Medina and Uvalde Counties withdrew from the Edwards 
Underground Water District and created their own underground water 
districts.169 
As of 1990, when the EUWD was composed of Bexar, Hays, and 
Comal Counties only, its total population consisted of 1,261,098 people, 
48.7 percent of whom were Hispanic.170  The Hispanic percentage of the 
voting age population in the district was 44.5 percent.171  Ninety-four 
percent of the EUWD’s constituents lived in Bexar County.172  From 1959 
until 1989, when the EUWD’s twelve board members were elected at large, 
no Hispanic person had ever been elected to the EUWD board.173  In 1989, 
the EUWD changed to a mixed system of board members elected from 
single-member districts and at large.174  In Bexar County, four board 
members were elected from single-member districts, and two were elected 
at large.175 Three board members from Comal County and three from Hays 
County were elected at large.176  Two of the Bexar County districts had 
Hispanic majorities among the voting age population.177  After the 1989 
change to the mixed at-large and districted system, these two districts in 
Bexar County consistently elected Hispanic board members.178  The at-
large elections in Hays County (27.8% Hispanic) and Comal County 
(22.9% Hispanic) failed to produce Hispanic board members.179  In 1992, 
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the League of United Latin American Citizens and other plaintiffs brought 
suit in Williams v. Edwards Underground Water District, to change all 
twelve board member positions to single-member districts.180 
On May 5, 1994, while the new appointive Edwards Aquifer Authority 
Board was still under consideration, a consent decree was entered that 
would change the EUWD’s twelve-member board to six single-member 
districts in Bexar County, three districts in Comal County, and three at-
large districts in Hays County.181  The United States Attorney General 
approved the proposed EUWD election system on July 26, 1994, with the 
first elections under the new system to be held on November 8, 1994.182 
Even the configuration of EUWD districts approved by the Justice 
Department incorporated the special purpose district principles from 
decisions like Salyer, discussed in more detail subsequently.183  By splitting 
up board member positions according to counties, the EUWD board took 
into account the differing user interests between the urban user region, 
Bexar County, and the two counties constituting the spring user region: 
Hays and Comal Counties.184  These two user regions each received half of 
the total representation on the EUWD board: six members from Bexar 
County, and three each from Hays and Comal Counties.185  As the 
population and ethnicity statistics already discussed indicate, the approved 
EUWD board would fail in terms of one person, one vote and minority vote 
dilution if judged as a general purpose unit of government.  The evaluation 
of minority voting strength within each user region becomes important in 
creating such hybrid schemes of representation, as the discussion of H.B. 
3189 in a subsequent section suggests.186 
Despite the undeniable dilution of voting in the EUWD’s 
configuration, the Justice Department reviewed the proposal to abolish the 
EUWD and create the Edwards Aquifer Authority in the context of recent 
litigation that had resulted in better representation of Hispanic voters on the 
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EUWD board.187  It was this perceived progress of the EUWD that formed 
the backdrop for the Justice Department’s evaluation of S.B. 1477 under 
the retrogression standard cited above from Beer v. United States.188  From 
Texas’s perspective, the Justice Department should have viewed S.B. 1477 
as subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to the extent that Section 
1.41 of the statute abolished the EUWD but otherwise as an independent 
event.189  Evaluating the Edwards Aquifer Authority’s appointive board in 
relation to the EUWD made as much sense as comparing the EAA to the 
Medina County Underground Water District: none of the existing 
underground water districts possessed powers that approached those of the 
EAA qualitatively. 
However, James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General in the 
Civil Rights Department of the Justice Department, made clear in his 
November 19, 1993 response to submissions from Texas in August, 
September, and November, that the question was framed as the replacement 
of an elected board with an appointed one and would be evaluated 
accordingly: 
 
Our review of this legislation under Section 5 is limited 
solely to those aspects that deal with voting.  Specifically, the 
proposed dissolution of the elected twelve-member board that 
manages a portion of the Edwards Aquifer and its replacement by 
an appointed board is a change affecting voting within the 
meaning of Section 5.190 
 
Viewed without reference to the history of the efforts to regulate the 
Edwards Aquifer, both the Department of Justice and subsequently the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia understandably saw the EAA as 
replacing the EUWD.191  S.B. 1477 explicitly called for the transfer of 
personnel, funds, and responsibilities from the one entity to the other.192 
One must ask, however, how the Justice Department could conduct a 
proper analysis of S.B. 1477 that was “limited solely to those aspects that 
related to voting” without analyzing just what the new board would do.  For 
example, in Allen, voters lost control over officials performing exactly the 
same duties: those of county superintendent of education.193  Voters elected 
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EUWD representatives to an information-disseminating, data-gathering 
body with some drought management powers, whereas the EAA would be 
a regional authority that would comprehensively manage any and all water 
drawn from the aquifer in a manner unprecedented in Texas history.  If 
EUWD voters had been electing representatives to do different and fewer 
things than appointed EAA representatives would do, then the substantive 
differences between the two entities necessarily affected “those aspects 
related to voting.” 
Moreover, from Texas’s perspective, the Justice Department’s 
description of the EUWD—that it managed “a portion of the Edwards 
Aquifer”—should have indicated that the EAA was not replacing the 
EUWD. Medina and Uvalde Counties together constituted the irrigation 
region, which used roughly a quarter of the water drawn from the aquifer.194  
If these counties did not comprise a part of a regional board, then the aquifer 
could not be regulated.  Moreover, Hays and Medina Counties clearly did 
not regard the EUWD as their most important, powerful, or effective 
representative body for aquifer regulation, since the Guadalupe-Blanco 
River Authority and other spring user regional interests had pursued the 
endangered species litigation independent of the EUWD.  Effectively, the 
EUWD became a Bexar County organization with some input from the 
spring user group region: Hays and Comal Counties.  The third user group 
region had withdrawn entirely.  The Department of Justice disregarded 
these political realities and also failed to distinguish among the user group 
regions.  The different configuration simply represented an “expansion” 
with a negligible effect on population: 
The appointed body would have authority over a larger geographic 
area than the existing water district, as it includes Medina and Uvalde 
Counties and portions of other counties not in the water district [the 
EUWD].  However, this expansion did not significantly alter the population 
as nearly 87 percent of the population in this geographic region was still in 
Bexar County in the early 1990s.195 
If one accepts that the relationship between the EUWD and the EAA 
was one of dissolution and replacement, it was clear that minority 
representation would be diluted.  Of the three regions of the EAA, the 
Justice Department pointed out that only Bexar County had any significant 
Hispanic representation on the appointing bodies, and none of the 
appointing bodies had Hispanic majorities.196  The appointive system 
would provide Hispanic voters with a more attenuated, less predictable 
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means of influencing the leadership of the aquifer board.  The Justice 
Department acknowledged that the new board was created in response to 
the Sierra Club litigation but noted that nothing in Judge Bunton’s ruling 
required the creation of an appointive board and that some Hispanic 
legislators had offered alternative legislation that would have preserved the 
measure of minority representation achieved on the EUWD board.197  
Moreover, the Justice Department pointed out that the state could not 
discharge its burden of showing no discriminatory purpose or effect by 
pointing to a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the change.198  
Hence, under City of Rome v. United States, the Sierra Club litigation could 
not serve to eliminate objections based on the potentially discriminatory 
effects of the change to an appointed board.199  The Justice Department 
letter concluded that the state of Texas failed to discharge its burden of 
demonstrating that the appointed board would not lead to a retrogression of 
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral 
franchise.200  Once qualitative distinctions between the EUWD and the 
proposed EAA were obliterated, the Justice Department’s assessment 
understandably paralleled Justice Steven’s description in his dissenting 
opinion in Presley v. Etowah County Commission: 
 
Changes from district voting to at-large voting, the 
gerrymandering of district boundary lines, and the replacement of 
an elected official with an appointed official all share the 
characteristic of enhancing the power of the majority over a 
segment of the political community that might otherwise be 
adequately represented.201 
 
The state of Texas’s second strategy for attempting to obtain 
preclearance—preserving the EUWD but transferring its regulatory powers 
to the Edwards Aquifer Authority—was frustrated by the view expressed 
in this further observation by Justice Stevens: 
 
A resolution that reallocates decision making power by 
transferring authority from an elected district representative to an 
official, or a group, controlled by the majority, has the same 
potential for discrimination against the constituents in the 
disadvantaged districts.202 
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Upon receiving the Justice Department’s letter of November 19, 1993, 
Stuart Henry, counsel for the Sierra Club, requested reconsideration of the 
decision in a letter dated December 22, 1993.203  Second, the Sierra Club 
asked for a clarification of the objection letter, inquiring whether the Justice 
Department’s letter could be construed only to object to the abolition of the 
EUWD, and not to the EAA’s creation standing alone.204  Third, the Sierra 
Club asked the Department of Justice to review two alternatives that had 
been submitted to Governor Richards: one that would drop S.B. 1477’s 
Section 1.41, which repealed the EUWD, and which would permit the 
EUWD and the EAA to coexist; the other alternative would grant to the 
TNRCC powers sufficient to regulate the aquifer.205  With respect to these 
two alternative pieces of legislation, the Sierra Club requested the 
following: 
 
If the Department will not reverse its decision, then we 
request that you advise Governor Richards that: (1) if Alternative 
No. 1 is passed into law, the Department will withdraw its 
objection with respect to Chapter 626 [S.B. 1477] as so amended 
because it is no longer a request for a change affecting voting 
within the meaning of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act; and (2) 
if Alternative 2 is passed into law, the Department will have no 
objection because it is not a proposal for a change affecting voting 
. . . .206 
 
Noting the dissimilarities between the EUWD and the EAA in terms 
of geography and powers, the Sierra Club concluded: 
 
It is irrelevant whether existing state law may already to 
some extent authorize the TNRCC, EUWD, Medina County 
Underground Water Conservation District, area cities and other 
local governmental entities to “regulate” withdrawals within some 
or all of the area overlying the aquifer.  An explicit statement from 
the legislature that either the new EAA or the TNRCC has the 
necessary aquifer-wide permitting authority is needed to avoid 
further litigation over state law.  Such an explicit statement, 
together with your confirmation that the new law is not a change 
affecting voting within the meaning of Section 5 of the Voting 
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Rights Act, hopefully will end the footdragging and finger 
pointing.207 
 
The foot dragging and finger pointing did not end.  In January 1994, 
Governor Richards refused to call a special session of the legislature to 
consider the two forms of legislation proposed by the Sierra Club.208 
However, in letters dated December 30, 1993, and January 19, 1994, 
Secretary of State John Hannah attempted to achieve, without the benefit 
of legislation, the Sierra Club’s first alternative: the coexistence of the 
EUWD and the EAA to eliminate the problem of dissolving an elected 
board.209  Secretary of State Hannah suggested that the objection letter of 
the Department of Justice itself operated to prohibit the implementation of 
Section 1.41 of S.B. 1477 abolishing the EUWD, but that no objection had 
been raised to the implementation of the remainder of S.B. 1477.210  Hannah 
explained that there was no conflict in state law in allowing the two entities, 
especially in light of the “largely educational” role played by the EUWD.211  
Hannah concluded that the coexistence of the EAA and EUWD would 
result in the “reallocations of authority within government” and shifts in 
power “among officials answerable to the same or different constituencies” 
described in Presley v. Etowah County Commission.212  As such, S.B. 1477 
without Section 1.42 would not be a change affecting voting as 
contemplated by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.  Hannah concluded by 
reminding the Department of Justice that Judge Bunton would appoint a 
federal monitor by January 7, 1994, after which time federal intervention 
in aquifer management would soon follow.213  In order to avoid a true 
federal “takeover” of the aquifer, Texas needed to meet the aquifer 
management deadline outlined in S.B. 1477.214 
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The Department of Justice disagreed with Hannah’s application of 
Presley to the proposed coexistence of the EAA and the EUWD.215  An 
objection filed with Justice by the Chairperson of the EUWD, JoAnn S. 
DeHoyos, had served to erode the credibility of Hannah’s argument.  In an 
act that reflected a keener sense for her organization’s survival than for the 
survival of the natural resource her organization regulated, Ms. DeHoyos 
wrote that the Secretary of State had mischaracterized the powers and 
duties of the EUWD as “largely educational;” in fact, the EUWD allegedly 
possessed broad responsibility to manage and control the aquifer.216  The 
Justice Department’s attorneys did their own evaluation of the proposed 
EUWD–EAA coexistence.217  The Justice Department found that the new 
law “gives the newly-created appointed body substantially all of the 
responsibilities that the elected body currently has.”218  Further, the Justice 
Department argued that there existed significant conflict in the 
responsibilities of the two organizations, and S.B. 1477 gave preeminent 
power to the new EAA where any such conflict arose.219  As a result, the 
Justice Department concluded that Presley’s holding did not remove S.B. 
1477 from consideration under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.220  S.B. 
1477 fell into the category described in Presley as “[c]ircumstances [that] 
rise to the level of a de facto replacement of an elective office with an 
appointive one [and require Section 5 preclearance].”221  The sole chance 
that remained for the approval of the EAA’s appointed board was 
preclearance via summary judgment motion in federal district court. 
The delay in implementing the Edwards Aquifer Authority carried 
serious consequences in the ongoing judicial oversight of the state pursuant 
to the Sierra Club litigation.  Before the state had filed its action in the 
District of Columbia in an attempt to achieve preclearance for S.B. 1477, 
the Sierra Club had filed a motion on November 12, 1993, requesting the 
appointment of a water monitor.  Judge Bunton granted the motion because 
“[n]o plan [was] in effect by any Federal[,] State [,] or local government 
entity that adequately protects against violations of the ESA caused by 
unregulated pumping from the Edwards Aquifer.”222  The Sierra Club’s 
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motion was filed pursuant to the Court’s Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, which had permitted plaintiffs to request additional 
relief after May 31, 1993, if Texas did not have in effect at that time “a 
regulatory system pursuant to which withdrawals from the Edwards 
Aquifer can and will be limited to whatever extent may be required to avoid 
unlawful takings of listed species [even] in a repeat of the drought of 
record.”223 
The delay that Voting Rights Act scrutiny caused led Judge Bunton to 
appoint a federal water monitor by an order dated February 25, 1994, to 
take effect in April 1994.224  The court found that the volume and 
complexity of the information combined with the expertise necessary to 
understand the information required the appointment of a monitor to assist 
the court in imposing “possible future remedial actions” should they 
become necessary.225  The appointment of the federal monitor signaled the 
possible onset of direct court intervention in the management of the aquifer.  
The monitor would continue in his tasks until “the State of Texas 
implements an adequate regulatory plan or system to prevent violations of 
the E.S.A.”226 
The State of Texas and the City of San Antonio therefore sought 
Justice Department approval of S.B. 1477 under the extraordinary pressure 
created by the federal monitor and the unknown plan the court might 
impose after the monitor had gathered sufficient information.227  Unlike 
minority leaders in San Antonio, city water policy employees saw federal 
intervention, rather than underrepresentation on the EAA, as the ultimate 
evil.228  One economist from Baylor University testified that real income in 
Bexar County could fall by up to $3.25 billion, and as many as 136,700 
jobs could be lost as a result of the reductions in groundwater pumping.229  
Although these were worst-case scenario statistics used to persuade the 
court, San Antonio had a tremendous incentive to retain as much control 
over aquifer regulation as possible.230  The appointment of the federal 
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monitor caused by the delay in preclearing S.B. 1477 was a harbinger that 
San Antonio’s worst-case scenario might come to pass. 
On March 9, 1994, the State of Texas filed a motion for summary 
judgment before a three-judge panel in the Federal District Court for the 
District of Columbia.231  Texas requested a declaratory judgment, either 
that all sections of S.B. 1477 should be precleared, or that Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights act was inapplicable to the provisions of S.B. 1477 except 
for the abolition of the EUWD under Section 1.41.232  The panel’s decision, 
rendered on October 20, 1994, refused to grant Texas either of its requested 
forms of relief.233 
The court in Texas v. United States reasoned that the application of 
Section 5 to S.B. 1477 depended on whether the Edwards Aquifer 
Authority was properly regarded as a replacement for the Edwards 
Underground Water District and concluded either that it was or that fact 
issues precluded summary judgment on the issue.234  The court pointed first 
to “significant overlap in the geographic range and regulatory power” of 
the two entities that made “meaningful differentiation impossible.”235  
Second, the court pointed to Section 1.41, which transferred the files and 
records, “real and personal property, leases, rights, contracts, staff, and 
obligations,” and funds from the EUWD to the EAA and substituted the 
EAA in any pending litigation or negotiations to which the EUWD was a 
party.236  The court concluded from these summary judgment facts: “It is 
difficult to conceive of a legislative scheme that would more thoroughly 
replace an existing body.”237  Texas’s first request for relief, which asked 
for preclearance of all provisions of S.B. 1477—including Section 1.41—
could not be granted.238 
The court also refused to preclear S.B. 1477 while invalidating Section 
1.41, which would have allowed the EUWD and the EAA to coexist.239  The 
court held that Texas had failed to satisfy its burden to show the absence of 
discriminatory purposes or effects associated with the legislation, even 
without the abolition of the EUWD’s elected board.240 
With respect to discriminatory purpose, the court pointed out that, 
under Washington v. Davis and Rogers v. Lodge, proof of discriminatory 
purpose may be circumstantial, and that the discriminatory purpose need 
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not be the primary motivation.241  Texas pointed to three forms of proof to 
demonstrate the absence of discriminatory purpose: (1) S.B. 1477 had been 
enacted in response to the Sierra Club court order, (2) all Hispanic senators 
and 23 of 25 Hispanic representatives had voted for the legislation in the 
state legislature, and (3) both Interior Secretary Babbitt and Housing and 
Urban Development Secretary Henry Cisneros supported the legislation, 
Cisneros having urged the D.O.J. to preclear S.B. 1477 because it had no 
discriminatory purpose.242  The United States responded (1) that the Sierra 
Club orders had never required the creation of an appointed board; (2) that 
several of the Hispanic state legislators had filed statements at the time of 
S.B. 1477’s passage indicating that, although they were voting for the bill, 
they felt it was discriminatory; and (3) that the statements of Babbitt and 
Cisneros had no probative value.243  The court cited authority indicating 
that the determination of motive or intent was inappropriate on summary 
judgment.244  The defendants’ evidence created a fact issue that precluded 
summary judgment as to discriminatory purpose.245 
With respect to discriminatory effects, the State of Texas first argued 
that the effects prong of Section 5 analysis cannot apply to the elimination 
of an elected body because the effect will always be retrogressive: minority 
voting power, along with everyone else’s, will always be reduced to zero.246  
Texas reasoned that, since Bunton and other cases suggest that the abolition 
of an elected body and creation of an appointed body does not automatically 
show discrimination, but only requires Section 5 evaluation, the courts 
cannot have intended to apply the usual discriminatory effects analysis to 
the abolition of elected bodies.247  If the court were to evaluate minority 
influence over Edwards water policy decisions, rather than voting power 
per se, the court would conclude that Hispanic influence would actually 
increase under the EAA.248  An expert for the State of Texas predicted, on 
the basis of the entities that would appoint EAA board members, that 
Hispanics would control two of the nine positions, as compared with two 
of twelve positions under the EUWD.249 
The Justice Department argued that the courts had rejected Texas’s 
argument concerning the inapplicability of the effects test to the abolition 
of elected bodies in cases like County Council of Sumner County v. United 
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States.250  Further, Justice observed that Texas had underestimated the 
number of Hispanic board members that would serve on the EUWD, were 
it allowed to exist: because of the consent decree in Williams v. Edwards 
Underground Water District,251 which created new minority districts in 
Comal and Hays Counties, the number of Hispanic EUWD board members 
would increase.252 
The court rejected Texas’s arguments under the effects prong of 
Section 5.253  The replacement of an appointed with an elected board clearly 
required evaluation of discriminatory effect; a change in governing 
structure would not always result in retrogression to zero voting.254  The 
case law dictated that the proper benchmark for evaluating the EAA board 
was the newest configuration of the EUWD board under Williams, which 
would produce more than two minority representatives.255  In any event, a 
comparison of the EAA’s possible minority representation with that of the 
EUWD involved issues of fact that were inappropriate for summary 
determination.256  Under Section 5 procedure, the State of Texas would 
have to begin the process of submitting plans to the Justice Department or 
the District of Columbia court until preclearance could be obtained.257 
In all likelihood, the drafters of the 3-3-3 appointive board for the 
Edwards Aquifer Authority did purposefully discriminate against the 
residents of Bexar County: not because of its large Hispanic population, but 
because they believed that agreement to comprehensive regulation of the 
Edwards Aquifer could not be attained unless Bexar County was grossly 
underrepresented in terms of population.  The likely fact that Bexar County 
suffered discrimination based on the size of its population points to the 
extreme difficulty of synthesizing the principles of the Voting Rights Act 
with the realities of creating an entity to regulate a common pool resource 
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Federalist No. 10, Racially Polarized Voting, and Special Purpose 
Districts 
 
James Madison’s Federalist No. 10 contains the best-known 
discussion in American political history concerning the guarantee of 
minorities’ rights in the midst of hostile majorities.258  Madison traced the 
existence of factions in society to natural differences in capabilities that led 
to disparities in wealth; the minority he sought to protect consisted of 
creditors, merchants, and other economic elites.259  The proposed 
Constitution, Madison argued, would create a republic in which the 
people’s representatives would represent huge areas and make decisions on 
many competing interests.260  Under such a Constitution, Madison argued, 
the danger of a majority faction forming around any single issue to 
tyrannize a minority faction would be very small: “Extend the sphere, and 
you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less 
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade 
the rights of other citizens . . . .”261  The danger of tyranny would actually 
increase with a series of smaller republics: “The smaller the society . . . the 
more frequently will a majority be found out of the same party . . . the more 
easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.”262 
Madison provided examples of this argument down to the extreme 
case: one majority oppressing one minority with respect to one issue.263  
The problem of Edwards Aquifer Authority governance presents the 
problem of two issues that present opportunities for majorities of the whole 
to invade the rights of other citizens: the use of water from a finite common 
pool resource, and race or ethnicity. 
In his discussion of Voting Rights Act jurisprudence in the aftermath 
of Thornburg v. Gingles, Samuel Issacharoff offers two insights into Voting 
Rights jurisprudence that are especially pertinent to a discussion of the 
Edwards Aquifer Authority.264  First, Voting Rights jurisprudence after 
Thornburg v. Gingles—and before Shaw v. Reno265—focused on the 
existence and extent of racially polarized voting patterns as an “evidentiary 
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proxy” to substitute for the impossible task of measuring the 
“responsiveness of governmental institutions to the needs of all citizens.”266 
By focusing on racially polarized voting of a persistent and extreme 
nature, post-Thornburg voting rights jurisprudence also sought to avoid 
redistricting or reapportionment simply to remedy the ills that inevitably 
befall the losers of a given election in a democratic system.267  Extreme and 
persistent racially polarized voting, serving as an evidentiary proxy for non-
responsiveness to all citizens on an equal basis, served to indicate a failure 
to allocate goods and services fairly among all the constituents of a 
community.268  Post–Thornburg Voting Rights Act jurisprudence sought to 
ensure that access to representative office would be a social good that an 
“entrenched and racially defined majority community” could not 
monopolize.269 
With respect to the Voting Rights Act objection to the Edwards 
Aquifer Authority, one should keep in mind that the delivery of city 
services such as water has formed the basis of political disputes divided 
along ethnic lines in San Antonio for decades. Communities Organized for 
Public Service, an organization that represents poorer ethnic 
neighborhoods, has put issues like drainage, police protection, and utilities 
at the center of its struggles for predominantly Mexican-American 
constituents.270  It is therefore understandable that the governance of the 
Edwards Aquifer would concern some sectors of the Mexican-American 
population in Bexar County.271 
Some scholars have criticized Voting Rights jurisprudence by arguing 
that “discrete and insular” minorities with intensely held beliefs on specific 
issues actually exercise a disproportionate influence in the political system, 
whereas heterogeneous majorities exhibit diffuse interests and a lack of 
organization.272  Notwithstanding the disproportionate influence of 
minorities united around specific issues such as gun control, Issacharoff 
points to the empirical relevance of a single issue—race—that unites 
otherwise heterogeneous white majorities with diffuse interests.273  
Issacharoff points to statistics gleaned from elections throughout the United 
States over time indicating that, despite diverse constituencies and issues, 
race and ethnicity continue to play a decisive role in the voting choices of 
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racial and ethnic majorities.274  Voting Rights jurisprudence after 
Thornburg v. Gingles (and before Shaw v. Reno) focused on racially 
polarized voting patterns as an attempt to correct for disproportionate 
influence by majority factions united around the single issue of race and in 
this sense addressed the concern raised in Federalist 10.275  Like an election 
in a small geographic area that turns on a small number of issues, minority 
interests are most likely jeopardized where a single issue like race 
consistently motivates a majority.276 
If one accepts the premise that racially polarized voting can serve as 
an “evidentiary proxy” for nonresponsive governmental institutions, one 
would agree that the counties comprising the Edwards Aquifer Authority 
provide many indications of a local government that is nonresponsive to 
minorities. 
Statistics bore out persistent racially polarized voting in Bexar 
County.277  LULAC cited statistical evidence of polarized voting in League 
of United Latin American Citizens v. North East Independent School 
District, in which LULAC sought to change a school district’s system of 
board member elections from at-large to single-member districts.278  
Statistical analysis of a wide variety of elections in Bexar County 
demonstrated the existence of consistent Anglo block voting, as well as 
block voting by African-American and Hispanic citizens.279  This polarized 
voting meant that the at-large school board system excluded minority 
candidates. Despite the fact that 24.6 percent of the school district’s 
population was Hispanic, and 5.3 percent was African-American, from 
1973 to 1994, Anglo candidates won forty-seven of forty-eight elections, 
in which minority candidates consistently ran.280 
The plaintiffs in LULAC also cited other Bexar County elections to 
demonstrate polarized voting: state district judicial elections, tax assessor-
collector elections, county commissioner elections, sheriff elections, State 
Board of Education elections, Court of Criminal Appeals elections, and 
elections for many other positions in Bexar County revealed less dramatic, 
but statistically significant, polarized voting based on race and ethnicity.281  
Voting rights scholars who have focused specifically on South Texas have 
also documented racially and ethnically polarized voting in the counties to 
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the southwest of San Antonio that depend on the Edwards Aquifer.282  
Polarized voting by Anglos in these counties is more statistically 
pronounced than in Bexar County.283  In order to elect a Hispanic political 
official in Uvalde or Medina county, for example, evidence indicated a 
district had to be “packed” to approximately 70 percent Hispanic voters, 
the maximum extent allowable under Ketchum v. Byrne, which provided 
guidelines on the extent to which supermajority minority districts can be 
created to ensure representation under the Voting Rights Act.284 
The need to prevent a tyranny of the majority united around a single 
issue can also be seen along an entirely different axis, however: that of 
water use. Reynolds v. Sims established principles that seem fundamental 
to voting rights jurisprudence.285  Yet, the form of governance that the 
Department of Justice ultimately approved for the Edwards Aquifer 
Authority’s board directly contradicts these principles. Some of these 
principles from Reynolds include, for example, that counties are not 
sovereign entities but creatures of the state legislature and therefore cannot 
receive representation as entities but must abide by the one person, one vote 
principle, and that the vote of a farmer and a city dweller should weigh 
exactly the same.286 
In order to understand how the Edwards Aquifer Authority’s board 
could satisfy Voting Rights Act requirements, one must look to those cases 
in which the Supreme Court has created exceptions to basic Voting Rights 
Act principles for so-called special purpose districts.  Although no one in 
the Edwards dispute characterized the Edwards Authority as a special 
purpose unit of government, principles derived from these cases informed 
the configuration of the EAA board. 
In Avery v. Midland City, the United States Supreme Court applied 
Voting Rights Act principles previously reserved for legislatures to local 
governments.287  The Court found “[l]ittle difference, in terms of the 
application of the Equal Protection Clause and the principles of Reynolds 
v. Sims, between the exercise of state power through legislatures and the 
exercise by elected officials through cities, towns, and counties.”288  The 
Court found that the Midland County Commissioners’ Court possessed 
mixed duties—legislative, executive, and judicial—that made it a “general 
governing body.”289  The Court held that the commissioners’ court must be 
redistricted in order to eliminate “single-member districts of substantially 
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unequal population.”290  Among local governments, the Court distinguished 
such general governing bodies as a commissioners’ court from “special-
purpose organizations.”291  The Court commented: 
Were the Commissioners’ Court a special-purpose unit of government 
assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of 
constituents more than other constituents, we would have to confront the 
question whether such a body may be apportioned in ways which give 
greater influence to the citizens most affected by the organization’s 
functions . . . .The Constitution does not require that a uniform straitjacket 
bind citizens in devising mechanisms of local government suitable for local 
needs and efficient in solving local problems.292 
The Supreme Court devised different ways to define a “general 
purpose” government: in Hadley v. Junior College District the Supreme 
Court construed “general” to mean “important” and concluded that the 
importance of education justified the characterization of a community 
college district as a general purpose unit of government.293  Justice Harlan’s 
dissent pointed out the many functions normally associated with local 
governments that the college district did not exercise.294 
The Supreme Court also considered what form of disproportionate 
effect on one set of constituents would trigger special purpose district 
exception considerations: Cipriano v. City of Houma and City of Phoenix 
v. Kolodziewski both involved municipal bond elections and refused to 
allow property ownership as a prerequisite to voting.295  These cases 
appeared to reject disproportionate economic interest in an election issue, 
by itself, as a justification for deviating from Voting Rights Act principles. 
Notwithstanding the Court’s disagreements in Avery, Cipriano, and 
City of Phoenix, subsequent to these decisions, the Supreme Court 
evaluated claims for special purpose district status under the Voting Rights 
Act by (1) distinguishing general from special purpose local governments 
on the basis of quality and quantity of functions and (2) evaluating the 
existence of a disproportionate impact on one group of constituents that 
would justify an exception to voting rights principles.296  In Salyer Land 
Company v. Tulare Lake Basin Storage District, a water district formed 
under the California Water District Storage Act acquired, stored, and 
distributed water for farming in the Tulare Lake Basin in the San Joaquin 
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Valley of California.297  The district’s enabling legislation restricted the 
votes for the district’s board of directors to landowners and apportioned 
votes according to real property assessments.298  Seventy-seven people 
inhabited the Tulare Lake Basin, eighteen of whom were children.299  Most 
of the fifty-nine adults worked for one of four corporations that owned 85 
percent of the land in the Basin.300  In addition to the acquisition, storage, 
and distribution of water, the district in Salyer possessed the power of 
eminent domain to acquire, improve, and operate water storage facilities; 
to generate hydroelectric power (which it did not do); to issue bonds to 
finance its functions; to conduct flood control projects; and to coordinate 
with federal and state agencies on water projects.301 
The plaintiffs in Salyer were small landowners, landowner-lessees, 
and residents, who alleged that the dilution or outright exclusion of their 
vote for the water district board violated the Equal Protection Clause.302  
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim, reasoning that “the 
appellee water storage district, by reason of its special limited purpose and 
of the disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners as a group, is 
the sort of exception . . . [Hadley and Avery] . . . contemplated.”303  With 
respect to the district’s limited functions, the Court focused on the water 
district’s small set of objectives, rather than the list of powers granted to 
the board to achieve those objectives.304  Justice Rehnquist wrote: “Its 
primary purpose, indeed the reason for its existence, is to provide for the 
acquisition, storage, and distribution of water for farming in the Tulare 
Lake Basin.”305  With respect to the disproportionate impact on one group, 
the Court reasoned that since property taxes financed all the district’s 
projects, the extension of the franchise to landowners only was justified.306  
The franchise was evaluated according to land benefitted, rather than 
people benefitted.307  Justice Douglas argued in his dissent that the Court 
had incomprehensibly approved a system that granted the franchise to 
corporations and echoed the qualitative evaluation of government functions 
found in Hadley v. Junior College District, supra: the flood control 
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responsibilities of the district were of critical importance to all the dwellers 
of the Basin, without regard to property ownership.308 
In Ball v. James, the Supreme Court extended the limited 
purpose/disproportionate impact analysis found in Salyer to exempt a water 
district with far-reaching powers from Voting Rights Act requirements.309  
The Salt River Agricultural Improvement and Power District of Arizona 
stored and delivered untreated water for the irrigation of up to 236,000 
acres in central Arizona.310  Forty percent of the district’s water, however, 
went to non-agricultural, urban purposes.311 
Further, the District subsidized its activities by selling hydroelectric 
power to hundreds of thousands of people in an area that included half the 
population of Arizona, including a large part of Phoenix.312  The district’s 
powers included the exercise of eminent domain, the issuance of bonds, and 
an influential role in the formation of flood control and environmental 
management undertaken in conjunction with other agencies.313  The vote to 
determine the board of directors was restricted to landowners with more 
than one acre, with the number of votes determined by the assessed 
property value.314 
The plaintiffs, who owned no property or less than one acre, argued 
that the almost 100 percent financing of the district’s projects from the 
delivery of hydroelectric power, the delivery of 40 percent of the water to 
urban areas, and the wide range of functions performed by the district all 
served to place it outside the special purpose district exception.315  The 
Ninth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that the hydroelectric 
power operation had transformed this district from a Tulare Basin-type 
operation into a unit of government with a variety of powers and 
constituents.316  Landowners did not both finance and receive the benefits 
of the district; hence landowners were no longer “disproportionately 
affected.”317 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and held that 
the special purpose district exception applied.318  With respect to the limited 
purpose requirement, the Court held that this district’s primary purpose was 
still the delivery of water for agricultural purposes, and the amount of water 
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delivered was determined according to the number acres of the farm in 
question.319  The water delivered to urban areas was delivered on an acreage 
basis as well.320  It was therefore understandable that votes were pro-rated 
according to property values.321  The district could not enact laws governing 
people’s conduct; the district did not administer functions such as street 
maintenance, schools, sanitation, health, or welfare service.  [This analysis 
harkens back to the quantitative, laundry list of functions approach to 
determining whether a government entity is general or special purpose].322 
The Court opined that the delivery of electricity was not a “traditional 
element of government sovereignty.”323  The number of rate-paying 
electricity customers could not convert the district into a general purpose 
government.324  Urban electricity users stood in relation to the district as 
customers to a utility company.  Redress for utility users was in the state 
legislature.325  With respect to the “disproportionate impact” requirement, 
the Court found that because the district did not buy or sell water but only 
charged to deliver it, the farmers relied on the hydroelectric power revenues 
for the delivery of water to their farms.326  The structure of the vote 
according to acres owned corresponded to this fundamental interest in the 
continued delivery of irrigation water.327 
Justice White’s dissent in Ball, joined by three other justices, argued 
that restrictions on the franchise where the decisions of the governmental 
unit affect all citizens’ lives can be justified only where such restrictions 
serve a compelling state interest: In Salyer, seventy-seven people were 
excluded from voting; in Ball, observed Justice White, half the voters of 
Arizona were excluded.328  In Salyer, the property taxes levied against 
voters served to fund the district; in Ball, rate payers funded virtually all 
water functions.  Justice White also pointed out that the Court had declared 
utilities to be of general interest and subject to voting rights requirements 
in Cipriano v. City of Houma.329 
William H. Riker sought to offer a justification for the controversial 
decision in Ball v. James by analyzing the special purpose district doctrine 
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in the context of Madison’s Federalist No. 10.330  With respect to units of 
government with many functions, Riker echoed Madison: the number of 
issues on which Congress would vote, combined with the size of the 
geographical area for which Congress would render decisions, would have 
the effect of canceling out potentially dangerous majorities on any one 
issue.331 
Riker cited studies that confirmed Madison’s observations with 
respect to legislative redistricting.332  According to these studies, no drastic 
policy changes had resulted from the reapportionment mandated by 
Reynolds v. Sims.333  The actual political and economic change wrought by 
legislative redistricting had been subtle.334  Riker then contrasted the nature 
of the policy changes wrought by redistricting with the hypothetical 
consequences that would have resulted from a restructuring of the water 
district in Ball v. James according to voting rights principles.335 
The utility operation of the Salt River District paid for $14 million of 
the $16.6 million cost of the total irrigation within its boundaries.336  The 
rate-paying plaintiffs would have dominated the decision-making of the 
water district had the district’s board been elected according to population.  
Further, the ratepayers stipulated that, if allowed to vote in the water district 
elections, they would shift the allocation of costs in the district to make 
electricity cheaper.337  The accounting information available on the water 
district’s operations indicated that the district’s board members acted as 
rational firm managers, charging a profit-maximizing price both for water 
delivery and for electricity.338  If the consumers prevailed, they either could 
have continued this practice, in which case their rates would not have 
changed, or the ratepayers could have acted as “myopic consumers,” 
shifting the financial burden of the district toward property taxes and 
increasing water costs disproportionately, up to six times the rate at the time 
of litigation.339  The shift toward property taxes and increased water costs 
could have had a catastrophic effect on the farmers and also could have 
increased the debt of the district and caused its bankruptcy; a private firm 
could then have taken over its operations.340 
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Riker concluded that the test for applying voting rights principles 
should be how drastic the effect on public policy would be.341  The smaller 
the number of functions provided by the governmental unit, the more 
drastic the change in policy wrought by a sudden shift in representation; 
hence, the more restricted the franchise should be.342  This argument echoed 
Federalist 10 and demonstrated the intimate connection between the two 
aspects of the Supreme Court’s special purpose district analysis: the more 
limited the functions performed by the governmental unit, the more drastic, 
or disproportionate, the effect on one group will be.343  Under this view, 
removing a unit of government from the special purpose district exception 
solely on the basis that it performs a qualitatively important function would 
make no sense whatsoever.344  In Riker’s view, the two-pronged 
approach—number of governmental functions and disproportionate 
impact—conformed to the Madisonian argument that made constitutional 
sense of Ball v. James.345 
Subsequent to the water district cases that limited the franchise based 
on property ownership such as Salyer Land Company346 and Associated 
Enterprises v. Toltec Watershed Improvement District,347 the principles 
developed in these cases were applied to other forms of limited purpose 
local government.  These cases especially dealt with governmental units 
that carried out a limited number of functions on a multi-county or multi-
municipality basis, such as watershed control districts and public 
transportation districts.348  The Edwards Aquifer Authority’s characteristics 
place it within this second category of multi-county, limited purpose 
districts rather than with the water districts. 
In the multi-county special purpose district cases, the 
“disproportionate impact” element of special purpose district analysis 
results from the potential effect of more populous counties on less populous 
counties that would result from strict adherence to population-based 
representation.  In Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, a 
New York state statute enabled voters to redraw boundaries and reconfigure 
duties among neighboring municipal governments.349  A majority of 
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Niagara County dwellers had voted in favor of such a reconfiguration with 
respect to a smaller municipality, Lockport.  However, Lockport citizens 
voted against the proposal.350 
Niagara dwellers alleged that the provision in the New York 
Municipal Home Rule Law allowing a smaller town to refuse a 
reconfiguration that voters in a larger town had approved violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because it weighted the smaller town’s votes much more 
heavily.351  The Supreme Court analyzed this problem according to a 
“substantial identity of interests” standard: if it could be shown that the 
interests of the two sets of voters were substantially similar, then one 
person, one vote should apply: Reynolds had dictated that municipalities 
were instruments of the legislature and not sovereign unto themselves.352 
However, a “substantial identity of interests” did not exist between 
Niagara and Lockport citizens.353  The Court observed that the proposed 
reorganization at issue would have shifted the balance of power between 
town and county governments and would have shifted disproportionate 
costs onto the smaller towns.354  As with the special purpose cases involving 
water districts, the New York law at issue involved a limited issue: 
procedures for the reorganization of local government structure.  As in the 
water district cases, the Court could discern a disproportionate impact on 
one group: residents of small New York towns.355 
Finally, as with water districts, Riker would argue that Federalist 10 
analysis applied to the situation: The specific nature of the issue, combined 
with the disproportionate impact on the numerically smaller constituency, 
meant that a deviation from strict voting rights principles proved necessary.  
One can immediately observe the applicability of “substantial identity of 
interests” analysis to the counties comprising the three user groups of the 
Edwards Aquifer Authority. 
Although the special purpose district principles of limited 
governmental purpose and disproportionate impact are directly applicable 
to the Edwards Aquifer Authority, the policy justification for deviating 
from one person, one vote in water district cases such as Salyer, Toltec, and 
Ball is directly antithetical to the policy objectives of the EAA.  The newly 
created aquifer authority represented an attempt to move three disparate 
aquifer user regions from default rules of usage that were exhausting the 
aquifer to new rules designed to ensure the aquifer’s survival.  The type of 
special purpose water district addressed in Salyer, Toltec, and Ball, by 
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contrast, dates from the turn of the twentieth century, when the western 
states sought to encourage the development of water resources as part of a 
strategy to encourage settlement.356  As Justice Rehnquist’s discussion in 
Salyer reflects, property law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries sought to create infrastructure by encouraging entrepreneurial 
opportunity with subsidies for certain categories of business enterprises.357  
The restrictions on the franchise based on property ownership described in 
these three cases reflect the control over local government states awarded 
to those who were willing to create infrastructure by developing and 
exploiting the state’s natural resources.358 
In the context of the Edwards Aquifer dispute described in this report, 
the logic implicit in Salyer, for example, might justify awarding almost 
exclusive control over the aquifer to the irrigation farmers of Uvalde and 
Medina Counties.  Since these commercial farmers undertook the risk to 
cultivate arid land for a profitable purpose, they would be rewarded with 
political control over a natural resource important to their business.  When 
one concludes that the structure of the Edwards Aquifer Authority was 
greatly influenced by the special purpose district exception to the Voting 
Rights Act, one should therefore be careful to point out that the EAA 
embodies principles developed with reference to the type of water districts 
seen in Salyer and Ball but rests on different policy moorings.  Even though 
the EAA seeks to regulate the use of water, it actually belongs in the second 
category of special purpose districts: the multi-county entity that regulates 
one issue for all its member counties. 
Finally, concerning the nature of the special purpose district 
exception, when one reads cases like Salyer and Ball, in which the Supreme 
Court upheld voting schemes that departed so drastically from otherwise 
accepted voting rights principles, one might assume that the special purpose 
district exception is an either-or proposition: either a governmental unit 
must adhere to voting rights principles, or else the governmental unit can 
ignore such principles altogether and even award the vote to corporations, 
such as in Salyer.  If the special purpose district exception were an either-
or proposition, however, the question would then arise of how the Edwards 
Aquifer Authority resembled a special purpose district in some respects but 
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still faced the Preclearance Process under Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act. 
In Chappelle v. Greater Baton Rouge Airport District, the United 
States Supreme Court held that a determination of special purpose district 
status means that the Court does not apply strict scrutiny to evaluate 
possible violations of Equal Protection.359  However, the Court also 
concluded that special purpose district status does not eliminate Equal 
Protection scrutiny altogether.360 
When the Texas legislature drafted legislation to configure a 
governing board for the Edwards Aquifer Authority that would satisfy 
Section 5 scrutiny, it attempted to accommodate limitations on the 
franchise that special purpose district considerations imposed with voting 
rights principles that the Equal Protection Clause required.361  The ultimate 
result was H.B. 3189, which amended S.B. 1477 to create an elected board 
for the Edwards Aquifer Authority. 
 
House Bill 3189: Conflicting Aquifer Interests Create a New 
Board 
 
San Antonio water policymakers attempted to “take it on the chin” for 
the San Antonio Region in the effort to change the primary rules of aquifer 
use and to create a new institution to enforce those rules.  Professor 
Ostrom’s analysis of common pool resource disputes suggests that the 
voluntary sacrifice of perceived short-term self-interests by a dominant 
common pool resource user can serve as a signal to other users that 
engenders trust and the creation of “cooperative equilibrium.”362  The 
Voting Rights challenge to the 3-3-3 plan for the EAA Board in essence 
declared that San Antonio’s leadership did not have the constitutional 
prerogative to act on behalf of the San Antonio region in sacrificing 
population-based representation on the board to such a great extent.  House 
Bill 3189 was an attempt to keep intact the principle of sacrifice of self-
interest by the dominant user region while incorporating constitutional 
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voting rights principles.  This section attempts to explore the significance 




When the Texas legislature convened for its 1995 session, the failure 
of the Edwards Aquifer Authority’s appointed board to obtain preclearance 
had made the reconfiguration of the authority’s governance a high 
legislative priority for both proponents and opponents of S.B. 1477.  In the 
House Natural Resources Committee, those who sought to create a board 
that would pass Justice Department muster and enable the new Authority 
to assume its duties sought to limit the debate to the issue of the board’s 
configuration alone and in effect to argue legislative “issue preclusion” 
with respect to the merits of the Authority itself.  The legislature had 
debated and agreed to the new Authority; the sole issue in the 1995 session 
was the creation of an acceptable governing board. 
Opponents of S.B. 1477, to the contrary, argued that the debate over 
the board could not take place in a vacuum; the merits of the Edwards 
Aquifer Authority itself remained at issue.  This was especially true for 
opponents of S.B. 1477 from the less-populated aquifer regions, or from 
any rural region that relied on groundwater: now that the Department of 
Justice and the federal district court had required that Texas meet Voting 
Rights Act requirements, rural groundwater interests were even more at risk 
than they had been with the 3-3-3 appointed board.364 
On April 24, 1995, the House Committee on Natural Resources 
considered the most promising of many alternatives proposed for amending 
S.B. 1477’s governance provisions: House Bill 3189, authored and 
sponsored by Representative Puente of San Antonio.365 
Representative Puente of east and northeast San Antonio explained 
that the first version of H.B. 3189 provided for a fifteen-member board 
elected from single-member districts, with four board members from the 
spring user region, seven board members from Bexar County, and four 
board members from the irrigation user region. H.B. 3189 provided for one 
person, one vote districts within each county and accounted for ethnicity in 
drawing boundary lines to create districts from which minority candidates 
could be elected; the districts also attempted to adhere to neighborhood 
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boundaries.  The bill called for the first elections to be held May 1996, with 
interim board members serving until that time. In addition, H.B. 3189 
retained the South Texas Advisory Council from S.B. 1477, an appointed 
body that would advise the board on the interests of downstream users. 
Representative Puente stated several times in the course of the committee 
hearing that Loretta King from the Civil Rights Division of the Department 
of Justice had stated that the Justice Department would not object to the 4-
7-4 plan with the boundaries as drawn, and Judith Sanders-Castro of 
LULAC had also stated that LULAC would not sue the state over such a 
configuration.366 
Representative Puente proceeded to explain the first proposed 
amended version of H.B. 3189, which had not yet received informal Justice 
Department approval.  Under the first amended version of H.B. 3189, the 
irrigation user and spring user regions each received five representatives, 
creating a 5-7-5 structure.  This structure was designed to increase fairness 
for the less-populated user regions.  This proposed amendment changed the 
configuration of the districts within each county.367 
Representative Lewis from Orange County in east Texas, who 
cosponsored the bill, offered a second amended version under which the 
spring user region would receive five representatives, Bexar County would 
receive seven representatives, the irrigation user region would receive four 
representatives, and downstream users would receive one representative 
appointed by the South Texas Advisory Council. Representative Lewis 
sought to convey to the legislature how the changes to the EAA board 
would help or harm downstream water interests.368 
Representative Corte from northwest San Antonio, an ally of San 
Antonio developers and the Edwards Underground Water District, 
introduced a committee substitute for H.B. 3189 with stiff opposition from 
other committee members.  Corte’s alternative exemplifies the way in 
which S.B. 1477 opponents turned the debate over the EAA Board 
configuration into a referendum on S.B. 1477 itself. Rep. Corte’s legislation 
would have created an “interlocal agreement” whereby the EUWD, the 
Medina Underground Water Conservation District, and the Uvalde 
Underground Water Conservation District formed a “liaison committee.”369 
Without explaining how this interlocal agreement would better 
achieve the pumping limits necessary to guarantee Comal and San Marcos 
Spring flows, Rep. Corte offered evidence from the Texas Water 
Development Board, which he interpreted to mean that none of the 
curtailments in aquifer use proposed for enactment by the EAA would 
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reach the targets set by the USFWS to save the springs in a drought as 
severe as the worst drought of record in the 1950s.  Since Judge Bunton’s 
order had required the state’s plan ensure spring safety even in the worst 
drought of record, Rep. Corte appeared to suggest that the Edwards Aquifer 
Authority should be abandoned in favor of a (less stringent) interlocal 
authority.  Representative Corte’s substitute was stalled in committee on 
the question of its germaneness to consideration of H.B. 3189, since the 
ostensible “committee substitute” went beyond the issue of the EAA 
board’s configuration and sought to replace the EAA. 
The committee testimony for and against H.B. 3189 revealed a great 
deal about the alignment of aquifer-interested parties and the concerns that 
each camp had in the event that the EAA finally came into existence.  Mary 
Arnold of the Texas League of Women Voters—which tends toward urban, 
environmental, and voting-related concerns—confirmed that the districts 
for the 4-7-4 board, as currently drawn, met Justice Department 
requirements.  Arnold described S.B. 1477 as a compromise and a step 
forward and opposed the continued existence of the EUWD in the event 
that H.B. 3189 passed.  (The future of the EUWD was uncertain, since S.B. 
1477 had abolished it, but then Texas had offered to keep the EUWD in 
coexistence with the EAA in an unsuccessful attempt to secure Justice 
Department approval of the EAA’s appointed board).370 
Ms. DeHoyos, the chairperson of the EUWD who undermined the 
state’s credibility in its negotiations with the Justice Department 
concerning the possible coexistence of the EAA and the EUWD, also 
testified.  She said that the EUWD could have written a regional water plan 
and controlled usage 20 years ago if the legislature had authorized it to do 
so.  Rep. Lewis, in a reproving tone, told DeHoyos that the legislature 
expected cooperation from EUWD in the transition to the EAA, including 
the transfer of 3.5 million dollars in funds to the new authority in the second 
year of the EUWD’s budget cycle.  DeHoyos asserted that the EUWD had 
always been cooperative with the EAA plan.371 
Also testifying in support of H.B. 3189 were representatives from the 
City of San Antonio Water System and the San Antonio Chamber of 
Commerce.  Tristan Castaneda, from the chamber of commerce, supported 
the 4-7-4 configuration because it had already received informal Justice 
Department approval and would provide a sound management plan for the 
state to pursue an Incidental Take Permit under the Endangered Species 
Act.  Cliff Morton, Chairman of the San Antonio Water System, purported 
to testify in a neutral capacity but supported H.B. 3189.  Morton pointed 
out that San Antonio had supported the 3-3-3 appointed board and had 
agreed to bear more than one-third of the EAA’s costs, even though San 
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Antonio clearly had more than one-third the users of the aquifer.  The City 
Council of San Antonio had passed a resolution supporting the elected 
board proposed in H.B. 3189.  The highest priority for San Antonio was the 
prevention of two more years of litigation.372 
Representative King, who opposed both S.B. 1477 and H.B. 3189, 
pressed Morton concerning the possibility of the 5-7-5 board, and Morton 
said he would personally support it.  King then asked Morton why his 
testimony concerning the 4-7-4 board mattered, since San Antonio would 
apparently support any board configuration as long as the EAA became 
effective.373 
The spokespersons for Uvalde and Medina Counties’ irrigators 
bitterly opposed the board configuration that H.B. 3189 would create. 
Sterling Fly III, counsel for the Uvalde Underground Water District, stated 
that any entity that regulated a natural resource should be evenly balanced 
among user groups and that H.B. 3189 gave metropolitan interests more 
weight.  S.B. 1477 had been a “bitter pill,” but H.B. 3189 was even worse.  
The proposed legislation diluted the voting rights of Uvalde County.  For 
Uvalde, passage of this law would be worse than simply allowing the 
federal monitor’s plan to be enacted, even though that plan was so 
restrictive as to be unenforceable.374 
Luana Buckner, manager of the Medina County Underground Water 
Conservation District, stated that the Edwards Aquifer Authority was a 
special purpose district and should have been presented that way, affording 
equal representation to each user group category.  One example of a 
problem she had with H.B. 3189: the way the lines were drawn under the 
4-7-4 plan, Atascosa County received too much representation in relation 
to the number of wells there.  Representative Puente asked Buckner if her 
district had not in fact opposed S.B. 1477, which was evenly divided among 
user groups, and suggested that the issue for Medina County was not really 
the board’s composition but the existence of the authority.  Buckner tried 
to backtrack and suggest that in comparison to H.B. 3189’s board, the 3-3-
3 board of S.B. 1477 was better. 
Kirk and Carol Patterson of San Antonio represented San Antonio 
interests opposed to H.B. 3189, and in reality to S.B. 1477 as well.  The 
Pattersons supported the above-described interlocal authority proposed by 
Rep. Corte. Kirk Patterson assumed the strategy of threatening to sue the 
state for voting rights violations if H.B. 3189 passed, since the 4-7-4 board 
did not conform to one person, one vote requirements.  Patterson also took 
the alternative and completely contradictory position that the 4-7-4 board 
should not be weighted according to population at all, since the EAA was 
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a special purpose district as contemplated by Ball v. James. Representative 
Lewis responded that the legislature could not make decisions about the 
aquifer based on who would sue because someone inevitably would do 
so.375 
Representative King, the most vocal opponent of H.B. 3189 on the 
Natural Resources Committee, took the position that H.B. 3189 provided 
no assurances that the state would solve either its Endangered Species Act 
or its Voting Rights Act problems.  With respect to the Voting Rights Act, 
King asserted that none of the amended versions of H.B. 3189, whether the 
5-7-5 or the 4-1-7-5 configurations, had received Justice Department 
approval, and that the smaller counties would not accept the approved 4-7-
4 plan.  With respect to the Endangered Species Act, King cited the federal 
water monitor Joe Morris, who had reviewed the proposed EAA plans and 
had concluded that these plans would not preserve the Comal and San 
Marcos springs in a drought matching the worst drought of record.  Citing 
the Texas Water Development Board statistics used by Rep. Corte, King 
stated that even if all pumps were cut off in the five-county area during the 
worst drought of record, the springs would still not be saved.  (Rep. King’s 
implication was that the state should pass nothing).  Rep. Lewis responded 
that such a drought was a once-in-a-century occurrence, and that the EAA 
was needed to apply for an Incidental Take Permit under the Endangered 
Species Act so that pumps would not have to be cut off during a drought.376 
Among the several amendments to H.B. 3189 was language included 
by Rep. King that the state does not own groundwater and that the EAA 
shall not take property without compensation.  The Natural Resources 
Committee ultimately approved the 4-1-7-5 version of the EAA board in 
H.B. 3189 proposed by Rep. Lewis. The vast majority of floor debate took 
place upon the second reading of H.B. 3189 on May 9, 1995. 
Representative Puente again urged that the issue at hand was not S.B. 1477, 
which had already been passed, but the governance of the Authority.  He 
warned that a failure to pass the bill would cast a cloud over the San 
Antonio economy; a city whose water supply was controlled by federal 
authorities would face great economic problems.  Failure to pass H.B. 3189 
would also harm the agricultural counties.377 
Representatives King and Hildebrand led the fight against passage of 
H.B. 3189.  King insisted that the change in the EAA’s board changed the 
dynamics of the aquifer issue for the agricultural counties, since the original 
3-3-3 structure had at least given the agricultural counties equal 
representation.  King repeated his argument from committee that the bill 
would not satisfy Judge Bunton’s or the USFWS’s requirements for spring 
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flow, and that the 4-1-7-5 board would not even satisfy Department of 
Justice voting rights requirements.378 
According to Representatives King and Lewis, S.B. 1477 and H.B. 
3189 proposed to create a “huge, centralized, vast bureaucracy just to get a 
Section 10(a) [Endangered Species Incidental Take] permit that’s never 
been granted for an aquatic species.”  King added that the Farm Bureau 
rightly opposed this bill as a taking of private property rights.  After a 
certain date specified in S.B. 1477, no new wells could be drilled.  This 
would wipe out the rule of capture.  A giant agency that decided whether 
to give landowners permits represented a drastic change from the current 
system.  If this had been an emissions testing bill at the federal level, a 
hearing would have been conducted.  Here, farmers were underrepresented.  
“You can’t make cake out of cow manure,” King concluded: “If you are for 
property rights, you are against this bill.”  King likened S.B. 1477 and H.B. 
3189 to the golden-cheeked warbler controversy, driven by 
environmentalists “hostile to property rights.”379 
Representative Hildebrand added to King’s argument: he regretted his 
failure to oppose S.B. 1477 last session, which had taken away property 
rights from farmers when it “took away” the rule of capture.  For example: 
one hundred irrigators in Uvalde County were grandfathered in at two acre-
feet per acre.  Others who had not yet developed those water rights on their 
land lost them.  This was unfair.  Hildebrand moved to table H.B. 3189, 
which failed.380 
Representatives Lewis and Puente responded to King’s and 
Hildebrand’s attacks. Lewis protested that both King and Hildebrand were 
attempting to use H.B. 3189 to resurrect their opposition to S.B. 1477 and 
that the issue before the legislature was not whether to pass S.B. 1477 all 
over again but whether to change its governance.  Lewis insisted that the 
aquifer was an issue of state, not regional, policy, and that a failure to pass 
H.B. 3189 would result in an unprecedented takeover of an entire water 
supply by the federal government.  With respect to property rights, Puente 
insisted that S.B. 1477 regulated private uses but did not take private 
property rights.  Puente disputed the notion that no new wells would be 
drilled after a certain date if the EAA became effective.  Rather, drilling 
permits would be issued if water existed in the aquifer that could be drilled. 
Representative Turner added with respect to property rights that there are 
responsibilities that accompany such rights.  “We have to learn to police 
ourselves, or the Feds will take over our resources,” said Turner.  Turner 
added that the farmers were misled if they thought they would have a fair 
voice in federal court and suggested that San Antonio would always prevail 
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once the problem became federal.  Puente reminded the legislature of the 
June 1995 hearing before Judge Bunton that would decide whether the 
Recovery Plan devised by the federal monitor would be implemented.  
Puente asserted that federal control would deter outside investors from 
coming into the region and that the federal plan would hurt all three user 
groups.381 
The next issue that received attention in the H.B. 3189 floor debate 
concerned the configuration of the EAA board in light of Voting Rights Act 
requirements.  Representative Conley, representing an African-American 
district in east San Antonio, and Representative Longoria, representing a 
Mexican-American district in west San Antonio, led the effort to amend 
H.B. 3189 to reflect the original 4-7-4 configuration, rather than the 4-1-7-
5 configuration that had come out of the Natural Resources Committee.  
Representative Conley stated that she had voted against S.B. 1477 because 
of its appointed board.  Since that time, she had been in contact with Justice 
Department officials charged with reviewing proposals from the state of 
Texas to reconfigure the EAA board.  Conley assured her colleagues based 
on conversations with Justice Department officials that the 4-7-4, fifteen-
member board would get preclearance.  However, the new 4-1-7-5 board 
would be refused because of the one appointed member from south Texas; 
the Justice Department considered this elected-appointed mix 
inappropriate. Other proposals, including a seventeen- or twenty-three-
member board, were uncertain but less favored by Justice than the 4-7-4 
plan.  Conley and Longoria insisted that the 4-7-4 configuration already 
deviated as far as they could allow from one person, one vote, since 90 
percent of the aquifer’s users lived in Bexar County.  Conley and Rodriguez 
said they would help to instigate litigation under Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act if the legislature passed a fifteen-, seventeen-, or twenty-three-
member board weighting the smaller counties more heavily than the 4-7-4 
plan.382 
What the other legislators did not know was that the 4-7-4 plan really 
did represent a compromise for minority representatives from Bexar 
County:  Representative Corte asserted that Judith Sanders-Castro of 
LULAC had told him, Puente, and others that any plan giving less than 50 
percent total representation to Bexar County would be unacceptable, and 
that LULAC would move to block it.  In reality, Representative Puente had 
already negotiated with Bexar County’s minority interests to achieve the 4-
7-4 plan, which representatives from irrigator counties in their floor debate 
opposing H.B. 3189 floor debate were depicting as a kangaroo court for 
Bexar County.383 
 








Representative Lewis said that he had also spoken with the Justice 
Department, and no final decisions had been made regarding preclearance, 
so the legislature should not make its decision based on some informal 
statement from DOJ attorneys. Lewis stated that if he were from Bexar 
County, he too would want to dominate the board, but that the 4-7-4 plan 
was unfair for this very reason.  The downstream users in Victoria and 
Corpus Christi needed representation because they were so heavily affected 
by aquifer use.  Lewis said that someone would inevitably litigate under 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, regardless of the board configuration 
chosen.  Representatives Longoria and Conley of San Antonio responded 
that to whatever extent Bexar County would dominate under the 4-7-4 plan, 
this was democracy: Bexar County had the vast majority of users.  Longoria 
asked, should a population of 1.5 million be dominated by a population less 
than half that size?  The issue was not one acre, one vote, but one person, 
one vote, said Longoria.  The fifteen-member board had already 
compromised the principle of one person, one vote in favor of the irrigators 
and spring users.384 
On the third reading of H.B. 3189 on the floor of the legislature, the 
4-7-4 plan passed and was adopted by the state senate.  Texas Governor 
Bush signed H.B. 3189 into law on May 31, 1995.  On August 8, 1995, the 
Department of Justice gave approval under Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act for the Temporary Directors of the Edwards Aquifer Authority to take 
their oaths and to assume office on August 28, 1995.385 
In 2018–2019, the EAA confirmed in Voting Rights Act litigation that 
the 4-7-4 formula for its governing board embraced the logic of the special 
purpose district exception as necessary to protect the interests of the three 
user groups. 
The 17-member board includes 15 voting members representing 
districts: seven in Bexar County, one in Comal County, one representing 
parts of both Comal and Guadalupe counties, one in Hays County, one 
representing parts of Hays and Caldwell counties, one in Medina County, 
one representing parts of Medina and Atascosa counties, and two in Uvalde 
County.386 
The districts do not reflect population distribution but are the result of 
what advocates of the system say are a compromise among urban and rural 
people who all depend on the same water source.387 
“‘The Court’s decision solidifies the carefully constructed balance 
struck amongst regional stakeholders when the EAA was created and will 
allow the EAA to continue to provide the highest level of services to all 
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users of the Aquifer in a fair and equitable manner,’ said Luana Buckner, 
chair of the authority’s board of directors.”388 
Luana Buckner, from the irrigation user Segment of the EAA, an 
erstwhile enemy of the 4-7-4 EAA board created by H.B. 3189, has now 
become a staunch defender of the 4-7-4 configuration when faced with the 
prospect of enfranchising more Bexar County voters.389 
 
Groundwater Governance Post-Shelby 
 
Given that the protracted negotiation and legislation concerning the 
EAA Board happened because Section 5 preclearance under the Voting 
Rights Act resulted in the Justice Department’s rejection of the nine-
member appointed board originally provided for in S.B. 1477, the question 
arises whether the Voting Rights Act will continue to play a critical role in 
the formation of groundwater districts after Shelby County v. Holder.390 
Shelby did not declare Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
unconstitutional.  However, the decision invalidated Section 4(b), which 
provided the coverage formula to determine which states were subject to 
the Preclearance Process.391  Unless Congress amends Section 4(b) of the 
Act to the Court’s satisfaction, Section 5 preclearance is moribund.  For 
cases that challenge the revision of boards that govern special purpose 
districts like aquifers, the elimination of preclearance raises serious 
questions. 
Absent preclearance, state and local officials who work to formulate 
governing boards for common pool resources may be more likely to use the 
special purpose district exception to deviate from one person, one vote.  The 
possibility will no longer exist that the Department of Justice will invalidate 
ex ante the composition of a board created to govern a common pool 
resource. 
Courts have applied the special purpose district exception to Voting 
Rights Act disputes in a number of contexts.392  One recurring fact pattern 
looks like this: the court concludes that a local government with an elected 
board and limited powers to regulate a sole resource on which two different 
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populations rely, the one large and the other small, can deviate from one 
person, one vote and give the smaller population more voting power than 
the larger one in order to avoid a “disproportionate impact” on the smaller 
group.  If this exception is constitutionally valid and makes it easier for user 
groups of a common pool resource to escape Hobbesian rules of use and 
adopt new rules of use to sustain a resource, then one might predict a 
positive result in the aftermath of Shelby: perhaps the absence of Section 5 
preclearance could eliminate scrutiny that impedes the transition to 
sustainable rules of use. 
Unfortunately, the (predominantly southern) states formerly subject to 
preclearance have often exhibited a tendency toward restricting the 
franchise for ethnic and racial minorities: “‘Since Shelby, states have really 
opened the floodgates to voter suppression, and we’ve seen laws that have 
discriminated against voters of color all across the country,’ commented 
Leigh Chapman, the director of the voting rights program at the Leadership 
Conference on Civil and Human Rights.”393  Texas has proven no exception 
to this post-Shelby trend, as protracted litigation to enact the nation’s 
strictest voter ID law that would have removed approximately 600,000 
minority voters from the rolls in response to statistically insignificant 
evidence of voter fraud reflects.394  This suggests that the special purpose 
district exception applied to common pool resources may become a 
mechanism for depriving citizens of the vote even where their inclusion 
would not jeopardize the balance among user groups necessary to make 
new rules work. 
Viewed in this light, the voting claims that the League of United Latin 
American Citizens (LULAC) recently brought against the Edwards Aquifer 
Authority—albeit unsuccessfully—assume special importance.395  LULAC 
brought two claims that challenged the apportionment plan for the single-
member districts used to elect directors to the EAA.396  The first claim under 
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; the second 
claim arose under 42 U.S.C. Section 1973, Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act, for alleged dilution of minority votes.397  The San Antonio Water 
System (SAWS) brought a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
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Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (the one person, 
one vote claim).398 
In the aftermath of Shelby, voting rights claims brought under the 
Equal Protection Clause and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act may well 
serve as ad hoc substitutes for preclearance under Section 5.  Much depends 
on whether the courts will choose to apply the special purpose district 
exception where the facts do not warrant it: where close analysis reveals 
that the governance of a common pool resource does not really face the 
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